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Abstract
There have been few attempts to model the behavioural microfoundations of charitable
giving, particularly with regard to the choice between giving money and volunteering. An
hour of a volunteer’s time is usually of a lower worth to the charity than a donation of their
hourly market wage. However the aggregate levels of donations of money and time are
approximately equal in value– a fact long regarded by economists as the “volunteering
puzzle”. To provide a solution to this puzzle, this thesis proposes a theoretical model
of pure and impure altruism and conﬁrms its predictions with an experiment. Donors
are shown to derive a “warm glow” from volunteering which is greater than the warm
glow from monetary donations. The thesis also develops a novel measure to estimate
the cost and scale of impure altruism. Approximately two thirds of the utility derived
from charitable donations is from impure motivations, and the remaining third is pure.
Consistent with this ﬁnding, the experiment shows that priming the pure motivations in
donors reduces the overall provisioning of charity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D64, D78, H41.
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1 Introduction
Philanthropy has always been a prominent element in the economic organisation of society,
and there are no signs of its diminution. Even citizens of political systems with deeply-
held doctrines of individual responsibility (such as the United States) demonstrate a
strong desire for altruism. As Adam Smith originally observed, the fundamental economic
assumption of self-interested rationality can only take one so far:
How selﬁsh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles
in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the
pleasure of seeing it.
-Adam Smith (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 3
At the same time, economists remain skeptical of the power of Smith’s statement in
describing many known facts about giving behaviour. As Becker (1974) noted, social
interactions are rarely one–dimensional, and even acts that seem pure in motivation may
follow solely from strategically selﬁsh behaviour.
Naturally, this raises questions of the scale of pure and impure motivations in seemingly al-
truistic behaviour. This has attracted much attention from economists during the last two
decades. Richer theories of philanthropic behaviour have been developed, which account
for the innate “warm glow” of donations, the signalling eﬀect of prosocial behaviour, and
the accumulative eﬀects on human capital from accepting high-proﬁle positions within
charities.
These developments notwithstanding, economists have been unable to say much about
the degree to which donors are motivated by these pure and impure factors. Since there
are no obvious examples of altruistic interactions which only involve either pure or impure
motivations in isolation, the scale of each factor cannot be identiﬁed in any convincing
sense. The following thesis will show that the choice of donating money or time in an
altruistic context merits further study and can be used to estimate the scale of pure and
impure altruism with a high degree of power. The following example will illustrate the
intuition.
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In the United States, a television show entitled “Secret Millionaire” graces the television
sets of the country on the sabbatical night. The premise of the show is both simple
and appealing: chief executive oﬃcers from the nation’s top corporations are coaxed into
participating in philanthropic operations on the poorer sides of their cities. The identity
of the participant is kept hidden from the recipients until the conclusion of the show.
At this time, the executive is expected to display an overwhelming act of generosity in
oﬀering a six-ﬁgure donation to a related charity.
Despite its popularity, the programme has generated a strong discourse of repugnance
amongst the public. Since the millionaires do not continue in their volunteer work, but
instead write a large propitiatory cheque, there is a widely held view that their altruism
has a sense of disingenuousness (The Washington Post, 2011). The argument perhaps
rests on the notion that there is less disutility in their parting with a relatively modest
amount of income than in laborious volunteer work.
The argument is counterfactual to one built from economic principles. We can only
conjecture, but cannot say anything conclusive, about the degree to which their choice of
monetary donation is impurely motivated, precisely because they made a solely monetary
donation. On the other hand, had the same CEO (who could presumably oﬀer his services
for a high hourly wage in the private market) continued volunteering as a painter, or
similar, in the rougher side of town, his impurity could at least be measured with a lower
bound. However, by continuing to work privately and then donating the proceeds to
the charity, the donation could be used with a much greater marginal product, hiring a
painter for tens or hundreds of times the eﬀective labour hours of that supplied by the
CEO. If volunteer work was chosen by the donor, one could conclude that the proportion
(in opportunity cost terms) of their sacriﬁce which went to consuming “warm glow” eﬀects
was at minimum the diﬀerence between their potential private wage and the value of their
volunteered labour, and the proportion motivated by increasing the value of the public
good was at maximum the value of their volunteered labour.
This style of ineﬃcient donor behaviour is, however, widely present in the aggregate data.
In Australia, the value of volunteered labour is worth signiﬁcantly more than the value of
monetary donations. Imputed at the most conservative estimate of value (the minimum
wage), it is worth twice the value of monetary donations. In the United States, the
proportions are reversed, but the value of volunteer labour is also approximately 1.2% of
GDP (Giving USA, 2009; Independent Sector, 2010).
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Table 1
Aggregate Giving Data
Percentage of adult Australians giving money 87%
Average amount given (by givers) $424
Median amount given $100
Total amount given $5.7 billion
Percentage of adult Australians volunteering 41%
Average hours volunteered by volunteers 132 hours
Median hours volunteered 44 hours
Total hours 836 million
Value of volunteer labour (imputed at minimum wage) $11.4 billion
Aggregated value of donations (% of GDP) 1.9%
Sources: ABS Cat 4441.0, 5204.0 (2006)
If labour markets allocate workers to their area of comparative advantage, an agent who
volunteers for charity must have a replacement volunteer wage that is less than or equal
to their private wage. Given this, the donor could increase both the charitable good
and their own income by continuing to work privately, and donating. This is commonly
referred to in the literature as the “volunteering puzzle” (Handy and Katz, 2008). A
cursory examination of the data available on giving ﬁnds that Australia has the same
volunteering puzzle, as volunteering rates rise, rather than fall, as the income quintile of
the donor rises (Figure 1).
This thesis demonstrates that the volunteering puzzle can be robustly explained by a
model of separable warm glow over donations of money and time, where the estimated
warm glow of time donations exceeds the warm glow of monetary donations, even when
volunteering is not socially visible. The goal is to uncover the baseline, or innate, degrees
of purity and impurity in altruistic behaviour. By developing a method of measuring
the price paid for impure donations, it is concluded that approximately two thirds of the
utility over donations is attributable to warm glow eﬀects.
This is less depressing than it may sound. For one thing, an impure warm glow motiva-
tion will still serve to increase the coﬀers of a charity. Secondly, it means that policies to
increase donations to charity need not be a zero-sum game. The less pure donor motiva-
tions are, the less crowding out will occur due to say, a government donation to charity.
There are however, signiﬁcant policy implications of being able to measure the degrees of
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Figure 1
Volunteering rates by income quintiles
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purity and impurity.
This thesis will proceed in six parts. The ﬁrst will examine the existing literature on
impure altruism and the decision to donate money or time, and identify the understudied
relation between the two. A theoretical model of donations of time and money will then
be presented, with predictions that can be tested empirically. The third section will
present the experimental design that can estimate degrees of pure and impure altruism.
The following section will estimate a utility function to account for the purely motivated
increase in charity, and warm glow eﬀects. The implications for charity and government
policy will then be discussed. Contributions to, and directions for further research will
be outlined in the conclusion.
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2 Literature Review
The economic literature has primarily studied philanthropy from a monetary perspective.
The literature on volunteering, or the donation of time, is comparatively scant. Yet more
neglected is the interaction between donations of money and time. This interaction is
important for policy analysis, and holds implications for the welfare of the donor and
for the charity. Much of the existing body of literature is normative in its intention,
and analyses the eﬃciency of both government and non-proﬁt organisations policies in
eliciting charitable donations.
Since charities receive much (and sometimes most) of their donations in the form of time,
there is a risk in accepting conclusions from studies that are one-dimensional in their
measures of giving. A policy that induces higher monetary donations may overstate the
total gains to the extent that donors substitute out of giving time. There is a need for
both theoretical and empirical study of the interaction between the two dimensions of
giving.
On the theoretical development, the foremost question is one of utility speciﬁcation:
should donations of time and money be treated as complements, substitutes, or neither,
under charity and of donor preferences? If donors are motivated, at least to some degree,
by the charity’s provision of welfare or some other public good, then donor preferences
will be dependent on the preferences of the charity.
2.1 Charity Behaviour
Standard theories of ﬁrm behaviour suggest that volunteers provide marginal product of
labour to the ﬁrm, which gives rise to a replacement wage for the volunteer. This re-
placement wage implies that donations of money and time are, at the margin, substitutes
from the perspective of the charity. To empirically test this prediction, Simmons and
Emanuele (2010) proved that there is a positive relationship between the minimum wage
and the amount of volunteer labour employed among non-proﬁt ﬁrms. Since no plausible
supply side explanation for such a response exists, they concluded the demand for vol-
unteer labour satisﬁes the Hicksian1 condition of being a substitute for paid labour. By
1Throughout this essay, the terms “Hicksian” and “Marshallian” substitutes will be used. Both terms
are concerned with the cross-price eﬀect of demand. A Marshallian substitution eﬀect is the gross change
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extension, one can conclude that volunteer labour must be, at the margin, a substitute for
monetary donations received. Further studies have yielded the same conclusion (Handy,
Mook, and Quarter, 2008).
Empirically, the amount of volunteer labour employed by charitable institutions is signiﬁ-
cant, and accounts for approximately 40% of the total labour force in the non-proﬁt sector
(Wolﬀ, Weisbrod, and Bird, 1993). Further, volunteers and paid workers usually complete
the same labour tasks, which strengthens the notion that donations of money and time
are substitutable inputs for the provision of charity. We shall proceed by accepting this
assumption, and analyse its implications for donor behaviour.
2.2 Donor Behaviour
The framework for donor preferences, and the implications for optimal government and
charity policies, are less agreed upon. At ﬁrst glance, this seems surprising – if the
preference of the donor is to increase the prevalence of charity, then the preference and
utility of the giver and the charity should be perfectly aligned. Donors would simply
choose the amount of income they were willing to sacriﬁce to increase the public good,
and then give in the dimension that was least costly to their own wealth. This simple
model cannot account for many stylised facts of giving.
Consider ﬁrst the motivation that excludes any extraneous factors, and rather includes
only the innate utility which an agent derives from donations that are observable only to
himself. There are still at least two innate components to the self that the donor may
derive utility from:
(1) The welfare of each individual will depend on both his own satisfaction
and on the satisfactions obtained by others. We here have in mind a positive
relation, one of altruism rather than envy.
(2) The welfare of each individual depends not only on the utilities of himself
and others, but also on his contributions to the utility of others.
(3) Each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic
satisfaction.
in consumption due to a cross-price eﬀect, measuring both income and substitution eﬀects. A Hicksian
substitution eﬀect is the change in consumption of a good that would result if the agent was compensated
to maintain their original utility, i.e. netting of any associated income eﬀects.
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-Kenneth Arrow (1972), p. 348
As such, the preferences of the charity and the donor are unlikely to be aligned, and
consequently, richer frameworks of philanthropic giving have been developed.
2.2.1 Pure and Impure Altruism
The majority of the early literature on altruism presumed that altruism was pure, and
therefore individual preferences were dependent only on the total supply of the public
good, and indiﬀerent to the level and composition of their own donation (Andreoni,
1990). Economists have since recognised that the philanthropic motivation to give is not
solely driven by a desire to increase the provision of a public good. People are often
motivated by an aversion to guilt, an egocentric desire to believe that one is both “good”
and generous (Andreoni, 1989), and the social acclaim that comes from a visible donation
(Benabou and Tirole, 2006). We deﬁne “pure altruism” as being guided solely by the
joy derived from expecting an improved welfare of others. Impure altruism includes all
the other aforementioned desires, and can be understood as the high-handed purchase of
moral satisfaction. Donor behaviour can be seen as the interaction of pure and impure
eﬀects.
Andreoni (1989) modeled utility as a composite function consisting of a private utility
over the personal sacriﬁce made, and another term that measures the level of provision
of a public good. The strength of pure and impure eﬀects across the population has
implications for how donors choose to give. If donors are responding from motives of pure
altruism, it can be expected that they only have preferences over the total value of giving,
and simply choose the most eﬃcient composition of gifts in terms of money and time. If
donors are also responding based on impure eﬀects, another framework for how agents
choose between giving time and money is required. There have been very few attempts
to address this.
Andreoni (1989) showed that the motivation to give was better modelled by impure altru-
ism, by developing a theory of crowding out. Under pure altruism, the charitable agency is
treated as a public good, and government spending ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation would
exactly crowd out the household’s monetary donations, since giving by others would then
be a perfect substitute for private wealth. However, under impure altruism, an agent’s
enjoyment is proportional to her gift or bequest, and public giving via compulsory ac-
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quisition of taxes is no longer a substitute for giving voluntarily. Applying this theory
to observed donor behaviour, Andreoni postulated that the level of giving that moves in
accordance with pure desires is very small (Andreoni, 1993).
The extremely small degree of crowding out observed empirically suggests that govern-
ments can in fact increase the level of charitable provision through taxation. Similarly,
if altruism can be treated as a consumption good, higher marginal rates of taxation will
further induce the desire to give, as the price is decreased under tax-deductibility. An-
dreoni argued that the relative degree of purity between agents was important, as it held
implications for the eﬀects of public policies pertaining to taxation and subsidisation.
Recent ﬁeld studies have focussed on the separability due to image eﬀects of volunteer-
ing. Carpenter and Myers (2010) studied volunteering hours of various ﬁre-ﬁghters in
the United States. They constructed proxies for pure altruism using a standard Dictator
game, and measured proxies for image concerns, such as whether the participants dis-
played that they were volunteer ﬁre-ﬁghters on their vehicle plates. The authors found
that volunteering behaviour is consistent with a ”warm-glow” motivation, human capital
investment and signalling to others. Overall, the proxies for image concerns and being seen
as a volunteer were the strongest motivation to volunteer, as the only signiﬁcant variable
for hours spent as a volunteer was whether the agent had a “vanity plate” signalling that
they were a volunteer. It was also found that volunteers generally had lower per hour
wages than the average citizen, but above average household incomes, suggesting that
volunteering could be a “warm glow” consumption good, with the standard income and
substitution eﬀects. Further, despite the average volunteer giving slightly higher charita-
ble donations in the “pure altruism” game than the control group, their households gave
only half as much to charity, suggesting that volunteering does crowd out ﬁnancial giving,
and that the two are unlikely to be perfect substitutes.
Impure motivations could explain the volunteering puzzle, whereby most donors volunteer
for jobs that they believe have a lower replacement wage to the organisation, than their
private (and of course, donatable) wage rate. High-earning individuals may beneﬁt from
the visibility of their donation in a time dimension which does not exist for the money
dimension. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) showed that the visibility of donations of
time has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on their eﬀort. Generally, most studies have been concerned
with the signalling eﬀect.
An alternate explanation is that the warm glow derived from donating money and vol-
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unteering time may be separable between dimensions, with declining marginal utilities
for giving in each of money and time. A baseline model of separable utility is yet to
be explored, both theoretically and empirically, in isolation of the associated beneﬁts of
signalling, and social and human capital accumulation. The present thesis will attempt to
measure the degree of purity with the advantages of a sterilised experimental framework,
and examine the policy implications of targeting pure and impure motivations.
2.2.2 In the Monetary Dimension
The responsiveness of monetary donations to price and income eﬀects has attracted sig-
niﬁcant attention. The price of giving to charity is deﬁned as the net cost to the donor’s
income. This is not equal to 1 if the donor is at a non-zero marginal tax rate, such that
pi = 1−ti. The price elasticity of giving has important implications for government policy,
particularly as the tax deductability of charitable contributions is often under question.
Feldstein and Taylor (1976) studied Treasury tax ﬁles for 1962 and 1970 to estimate
the donation elasticity of price and income eﬀects. The authors found that donations
were income inelastic, as a 1% increase in incomes would increase donations by 0.7%.
In contrast, giving was price-elastic, as a 1% increase in the price of giving (deﬁned as
a decrease in the individual marginal rate of taxation, holding income eﬀects constant)
would decrease donations by -1.3%.
The tax price elasticity holds implications for whether the tax deductability of charita-
ble donations is eﬃcient for the provision of public goods. The authors remarked that
extra government revenues donated to charity after removing the tax deduction should
be substitutes for private donations, whilst being budget neutral. A unit elasticity would
imply that the loss of government revenue due to the deductability is exactly equal to
the increase in private philanthropy. Finding an elasticity greater than 1 reaﬃrmed that
additional gifts were greater than the loss to Treasury income, and led the authors to
conclude the policy was eﬃcient.
Andreoni and Payne (2003) explored the eﬀect of government grants on compulsory char-
itable donations. To the extent that donations are based on a purely altruistic motive (a
concern for the welfare of recipients), as opposed to being a form of high-handed“warm
glow” consumption good for the donor, government donations to charity may be ineﬃ-
cient or counterproductive by reducing private donations. The crowding out eﬀect was
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found to be greater than one-for-one. Most of this behaviour, however, can be explained
as a reduced eﬀort on the behalf of charities themselves to solicit further donations as
they approach their budgetary requirements Andreoni and Payne (2011).
Experimental methods could ﬁll this void in the literature by measuring the pure demand
response of donor behaviour in a context where the charity does not interact with the
donor, such as in Andreoni (1993). The present thesis will extend this context to examine
the joint donations of money and volunteered time, rather than monetary donations alone.
2.2.3 In the Time Dimension
Fundamentally, the supply of volunteer labour should be inﬂuenced by four major eco-
nomic factors: income eﬀects, the opportunity cost of volunteering (private wage), the
cross-price of monetary giving, and crowding out eﬀects due to government support.
In the ﬁrst major study of volunteering, Mueller (1975) found that the hours of work
could not be explained by a desire to give to charity. If volunteer work was motivated by
an altruistic desire, it is reasonable to expect that the hours volunteered should be based
on the cost of giving in the monetary dimension, that is, the private wage rate. Mueller
regressed the hours of volunteering work on individual and household hourly wages, and
found that neither was a signiﬁcant predictor of volunteer labour. Rather, the author
concluded that volunteer work appeared to be motivated by donors investing in their
human capital (Becker, 1964).
In the next major economic study, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) tested the model of
volunteering human capital investment against the idea that it was a ”consumption good”,
where agents purchased altruistic donations. The former assumes that volunteering yields
no present utility to the volunteer, and is only an investment in future wages and therefore,
utility. The authors concluded that both desires explained the supply of volunteer labour.
The research identiﬁed volunteering as a complement to monetary donations, due to
a signiﬁcant cross-price elasticity of -1.2%. Further, the paper found that there was
signiﬁcant but incomplete crowding out of volunteering due to government spending.
Freeman (1997) then added a powerful unstudied element to the literature by ﬁnding an
omitted variable that diminished the value of all discovered income, own and cross-price
eﬀects. Freeman found that the smoothly deﬁned standard labour supply analysis of the
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volunteering choice can only partially explain the decision. He found that most signiﬁcant
impetus to volunteer is in fact the quality of “being asked” to do so by the charity, or
another volunteer in one’s social network, suggesting that volunteering is largely explained
by a moral compulsion experienced when requested to volunteer.
Freeman also attempted to shed light on the puzzle of why volunteers with high oppor-
tunity costs volunteered for charitable work which held a low replacement wage. As the
survey data included a perceived hourly value of volunteer labour, donors were clearly
aware of the value diﬀerential. Using this, Freeman was able to construct a measure of
volunteer labour value to actual wage rates. The parameter was determined to be statis-
tically insigniﬁcant. Further, most also responded that they were not constrained in their
private labour supply, and could work more hours for a higher wage if desired. Again,
this suggests that the donor’s utility derived from giving ﬁnancially and volunteering is
separable.
The paper also demonstrated the issue in studying the decision from self-reported survey
data. Comparing the US Census Population and Gallup survey from two adjacent years,
the econometric analysis of labour supply analysis yielded inconsistent results. Between
the two datasets, the income and substitution eﬀects gained and lost signiﬁcance, and
even signiﬁcant variables reversed in sign, under an identical econometric framework.
Therefore, it is obvious that the literature would beneﬁt from cleaner measures of decision
making.
2.2.4 Interactions of Money and Time
Andreoni’s (1989) seminal papers on pure and impure models of donation eventually
sparked some interest in the study of donations of money and time. Andreoni’s model
suggested that the motivation to give was predominantly based on the private consump-
tion of ”altruism” rather than the public provision of it. Extending the intuition of this
model, it suggests that volunteers may in part base their decision to donate time or money
on whichever would, at the margin, procure the greater “warm glow”.
Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996) then examined the volunteering puzzle, disagreeing
with prior models which were not built on microfoundational optimisation problems.
Instead, they built a framework where donors derived separable utility from monetary
donations and value of volunteer labour in terms of the replacement wage. They also
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found that donations of time and money appeared to be gross complements at the margin,
but under a Hicksian notion of substitution (removing the income eﬀect), they were in
fact substitutes. This suggests that crowding out may exist between the two dimensions.
A pure model of altruism predicts that government spending perfectly crowds out chari-
table giving, yet empirical studies have not shown this. Duncan (1999) argued that this
was in part due to the fact that the models were incomplete in that they only examined
giving in the sole dimension of money. Also, the literature had no estimates of the price
elasticity of total charitable contributions, only donations of time and money separately,
which was not equivalent to knowing how tax policy aﬀects the value of contributions and
therefore the supply of the public good. Holding taxation constant, Duncan found that a
government grant will crowd out the joint value of private giving in money and time by
26 cents in each dollar. The estimate may suﬀer from an endogeneity problem if charities
work less hard for donations after receiving government support. Andreoni and Payne
(2003) found signiﬁcant evidence of this.
The ﬁrst major attempt to model the volunteering puzzle as a theoretical framework
was courtesy of Handy and Katz (2008). The authors attempted to resolve the puzzle
by assuming that individuals are rational in deriving their utility only from the value
donated to charity, such that donations are nonseparable in the dimensions of money and
time. The solution to the puzzle was found by incorporating a disutility of private work
into agents preferences that is greater than the disutility of volunteering. However, due
to a lack of data and experimental evidence, their claim has not been empirically tested.
Amongst the few papers that have studied the volunteering and giving decision, one
common ﬁnding has been that of gross complements between donations of money and
time (Brown and Lankford, 1992). However, complementary preferences are diﬃcult to
justify, and the conclusion seems questionable. In contrast, (Wolﬀ, Weisbrod, and Bird,
1993) studied volunteering behaviour among hospital volunteers in a more controlled
setting, where donors were of a very similar socio-demographic status. They found a
positive cross-price elasticity (1.6%) and concluded that agents saw donations of money
and time as substitutes at the margin.
The omitted variable bias found in the quality of “being asked” may account for the
cross-price elasticity ﬁnding. It may similarly be that other factors that induce lower
prices (i.e. higher incomes and therefore higher tax rates) also increase the likelihood
that some charities will eventually ask donors to volunteer. It may also be a product
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of social networks– if people in similar tax brackets are likely to be more closely linked
socially, moral pressures may increase the likelihood of being asked. Complementary to
the ﬁnding that “being asked to volunteer” dominated the decision, Freeman also found
that factors associated with higher tax brackets, such as having a high family income,
increased the likelihood of being asked. Therefore, there is a possibility that in the ﬁeld
data, the ﬁnding that donations of money and time present cross-price eﬀects suggestive of
complementarity is merely a product of reduced form speciﬁcation. Andreoni, Gale, and
Scholz (1996) also believed that the complementarity ﬁnding lacked microfoundations,
and was due to the lack of structural, micro-founded econometric speciﬁcations.
Taking the literature into account, all of the holes identiﬁed will be improved upon by
developing a structural model of utility. The model could account for the total eﬀects of
policies on charitable donations, and the degree of crowding out without the response of
charitable fundraising eﬀort. A structural econometric model would also allow estimates
of the degree of pure and impure altruism in giving, a topic that has yielded considerable
comment, but is considered diﬃcult to estimate. Further, the reliance on survey data has
been shown to yield inconsistent conclusions, particularly due to the diﬃculty in ﬁnding
panels of data that include joint donations of money and time. One clear advantage
of adding to this literature with experimental data is that it will provide a panel that
is unaﬀected by the changes in the state of the business cycle, family composition and
volunteering opportunities, and other unobserved factors, and therefore provide clean
estimates of these eﬀects.
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3 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
The following section presents a theoretical model of altruism, that accounts for both
pure and impure elements of altruistic giving, in both money and time. The implications
for the experiment, and a series of hypotheses will follow.
The model contained herein is, in part, based on a description of a utility framework
given in Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996). Andreoni described a model where agents
derived utility from the increase in the value of the public good, and separable utilities
over the warm glow eﬀects from monetary donations and volunteering. The assumption
of separability over warm glow is necessary to explain the prevalence of volunteering in
low-value positions.
The utility over the public good is modelled as independent of its current size, and there-
fore agents only derive utility over the increased size of the public good. This is motivated
by the behavioural ﬁndings of Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), who showed the value as-
signed to improving a public good does not depend on the quantity, or “scope” of the good
in question. This ﬁnding is recurrent throughout the behavioural economics literature.
The following section outlines the description of the model, and the predictions for altru-
ists of pure, impure and mixed motivations.
3.1 Model Description
Deﬁnition 3.1. Deﬁne a pure altruist as an agent who derives the value of donating to
charity solely from the increase in value of the provisioning of the charity itself.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Deﬁne an impure altruist as an agent who derives the value of donating to
charity solely from the warm glow eﬀects of their personal sacriﬁces of money and/or time.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Deﬁne a mixed altruist as an agent who derives the value of donating
charity both from the increase in value of the public good itself, and the warm glow eﬀects
of their own sacriﬁces of money and/or time.
Therefore an altruist that possesses both pure and impure motivations for donating can
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be represented by the following utility function:
U = F [E−g+(H−hv)(1− t)wp]+G[g(1+m)+(H−hv)tλwp+hvwv]+I[g]+J [hv] (1)
Where: F is the argument in the utility function over a composite consumption good, or
alternatively, income.
G is the argument representing the utility derived from the provision of the public good
– that is, the charity.
I is the warm-glow argument of monetary giving.
J is the warm-glow argument of volunteering.
E is the agent’s non-labour endowment.
g is the monetary gift of the agent to the charity.
m is the matching donation rate, hence 1
1+m
is the eﬀective price for the donor to increase
the public good with a monetary donation. It does not however, change the price of warm
glow, which is proportional only to the amount the donor sacriﬁces.
wp is the private hourly wage rate of the agent.
wv is the hourly value of the volunteer labour to the charity.
H is the total time available to the agent.
hv is the length of time spent volunteering for the charity.
∴ H − hv is the length of time spent working for a private wage.
t is the tax on private wages
λ is a variable that denotes the proportion of tax that is apportioned to charity by the
government. In the experiment it is a discrete variable- the tax is either donated to charity
in its entirety (1) or not (0).
All utility functions are increasing in their arguments, twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and concave. Further, we impose the standard limiting assumptions and Inada conditions,
hence:
dU
dx
> 0 ∀ x ∈ {F,G, I, J} (2)
d2U
dx2
< 0 ∀ x ∈ {F,G, I, J} (3)
lim
x→0
dU
dx
= ∞∀ x ∈ {F,G, I, J} (4)
lim
x→∞
dU
dx
= 0 ∀ x ∈ {F,G, I, J} (5)
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3.2 Pure Altruist
Therefore an altruist that is only concerned with, as Arrow writes, “the satisfaction of
himself and...the satisfaction obtained by others” can be modelled by relinquishing the
egoistic “warm glow” parameters of the above formulation:
Upure = F [E − g + (H − hv)(1− t)wp] +G[g(1 +m) + (H − hv)tλwp + hvwv] (6)
Deﬁnition 3.4. Deﬁne a choice of {g, hv} as interior iﬀ 0 < g < Ymax and 0 < hv < H
(i.e. the agent donates some positive money and time, but not the maximum).
Proposition 1. A pure altruist will never simultaneously donate money and time if
(1+m)(1− t)wp = wv−λtwp. She will never donate time if (1+m)(1− t)wp > wv−λtwp.
She will never donate money if (1 +m)(1 − t)wp < wv − λtwp. Note that the constraint
is ‘generic’ in the sense that with continuous variables, it should always be satisﬁed. 2
Proof. Consider any arbitrary interior choice of {g, hv}.
For simplicity, start with the case where λ = 0 (i.e. the government does not donate any
taxes to charity).
Case A: (1 +m)(1− t)wp > wv
A donation of time hv has the value to the charity wvhv, whilst the agent retains the
income from working, minus their donation, which equals (H − hv)(1 − t)wp − g. The
time spent volunteering has an opportunity cost of (1− t)wphv.
Consider if the agent had instead worked privately for an additional amount of time, hv,
and donated the income earned during this additional time to charity. Denote this choice
as {g′, h′v}, which necessitates that h′v = 0. Note that the ﬁnal level of income available
to the agent remains unchanged between {g, hv} and {g′, h′v}, since the entire change in
wages is donated. Denote the increased level of charity from the monetary donation as
Δg = (1 + m)(1 − t)wphv. Denote the reduced provision of charity from the reduction
in volunteered time as Δv = wvhv. Therefore the total change in the level of charity is
Δg − Δv = (1 + m)(1 − t)wphv − wvhv. But since (1 + m)(1 − t)wp > wv, it follows
2Proposition 1 combined also formalises the “volunteering puzzle” mathematically. In the ﬁeld, gen-
erally governments do not oﬀer matching donations, and tax donations are deductible, which simpliﬁes
the condition to wp = wv, suggesting that agents should only ever donate money and volunteer for the
charity if the volunteer value of their labour is exactly equal to their market wage.
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immediately that Δg − Δv > 0. Therefore, {g′, h′v} dominates {g, hv}, because U ′G > 0,
and the level of charity has increased whilst the level of income is unchanged.
Now since {g′, h′v}  {g, hv} and h′v = 0, and {g, hv} was an arbitrary interior choice, it
follows that all interior choices will be dominated, and a pure altruist would not donate
positive time.
Case B: (1 +m)(1− t)wp < wv
Suppose the agent reduces their monetary donation, g, to 0, but volunteers for an ad-
ditional amount of time, so that their total income remains unchanged. This additional
amount of volunteered time must be g
(1−t)wp . Denote this choice as {g′′, h′′v}. Denote the
reduced level of charity from the change in monetary donation as Δg = (1+m)g. Denote
the increase provision of charity from the increase in volunteered time as Δv =
g
(1−t)wpwv.
Therefore the total change in the level of charity is Δv − Δg = g(1−t)wpwv − (1 + m)g.
But since (1 +m)(1 − t)wp < wv, it follows immediately that Δv − Δg > 0. Therefore,
{g′′, h′′v} dominates {g, hv}, because U ′G > 0, and the level of charity has increased whilst
the level of income is unchanged.
Now since {g′′, h′′v}  {g, hv} and g′′ = 0, and {g, hv} was an arbitrary interior choice, it
follows that all interior choices will be dominated, and a pure altruist would not donate
positive money.
Now since Cases A and B are mutually exhaustive, it follows that a pure altruist will
never donate money and time jointly if (1 +m)(1− t)wp = wv − λtwp.3
∴ For the pure altruist, the solution is noninterior, and characterised according to the
following conditions.
If (1 +m)(1− t)wp > wv − λtwp
dU
dg
= −F ′[E − g + (1− t)wpH] +mG′[gm+ λtwph] = 0 (7)
If (1 +m)(1− t)wp < wv − λtwp
dU
dhv
= −(1− t)wpF ′[E − g + (1− t)(H − hv)wp] + (wv − λtwp)G′[wvhv + λtwph] = 0
(8)
3The proof was only provided for the case λ = 0, for brevity. The proof for λ = 1 follows via the same
intuition– one dimension of giving must be more cost-eﬀective at increasing charity.
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Deﬁnition 3.5. Deﬁne crowding out of donations as where a government donation to
charity reduces the voluntary donation of the agent from their disposable income, g or hv.
The level of crowding out will be considered incomplete if the net provisioning of charity
still rises.
Proposition 2. A government donation of taxation revenue to charity will partially crowd
out a pure altruist’s donations. The degree of crowding out must always be incomplete.
Proof. The proof will proceed in two parts. The ﬁrst will show that crowding out exists.
The second will show that crowding out is incomplete, such that the net provisioning of
charity still rises.
Case A: (1 +m)(1− t)wp > wv − λtwp
Implicitly diﬀerentiating the F.O.C. (7), it follows that:
dg
dλ
= − HtwpmG
′′
F ′′ +m2G′′
< 0 (9)
Therefore, any increase in government donation of taxation revenue to charity, λ, crowds
out the voluntary donation, g.
Case B: (1 +m)(1− t)wp < wv − λtwp
Implicitly diﬀerentiating the F.O.C. (8), it follows that:
dhv
dλ
=
twp(G
′ + (H − hv)(λtwp − wv)G′′)
(1− t)2w2pF ′′ + (λtwp − wv)2G′′
< 0 (10)
(Note that the condition for Case B requires that (λtwp − wv) < 0.)
Therefore, any increase in government donation of taxation revenue to charity, λ, crowds
out volunteering, hv.
It is established that crowding out must occur. The following section will show that
crowding out is incomplete.
Consider Case A where λ = 0. From Proposition 1, a pure altruist will only donate
money to charity in this case. Therefore, her choice is only over allocating between two
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goods: her income, Y = E − g + wpH(1− t), and the increase in charity, V = g(1 +m).
This is represented in Figure 2.
Therefore, her budget constraint is represented by line AB, of gradient m, and by the
standard marginal rate of substitution condition, their her of V, Y on AB requires
U ′Y
U ′V
= m.
Consider now the case where λ′ > 0. Hence Y ′ = E−g′+wpH(1−t) and V ′ = g′(1+m)+
λtwpH. Therefore the new budget constraint is given by CDB, of the same gradient 1+m.
Again, their choice of V ′, Y ′ on CB requires
U ′
Y ′
U ′
V ′
= m. From equation (9), g′ < g and
therefore Y ′ > Y . However since both arguments are concave, {U ′′Y , U ′′V } < 0. Therefore,
for the marginal rate of substitution to be unchanged, since Y ′ > Y it must be that V ′ >
V . Since V ′ > V , the net provision of charity has increased and crowding out is incomplete.
Figure 2
Graphical representation of incomplete crowding out
The same incompleteness proof follows with trivial diﬀerences for Case B, not supplied
for brevity.
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3.3 Impure Altruist
A completely impure altruist will not have any public good element in their utility func-
tion. Their desire to donate to charity is only due to the desire to experience the warm
glow of sacriﬁcing their money and time. Hence it can be represented by:
Uimpure = F [E − g + (H − hv)(1− t)wp
]
+ I[g
]
+ J [hv
]
(11)
∴ For the impure altruist, there is a unique interior solution that is characterised by the
following two conditions. The second inada condition (5) requires this solution to always
be interior.
dU
dhv
= −(1− t)wpF ′[E − g + (1− t)(H − hv)wp] + J ′[hv] = 0 (12)
dU
dg
= −F ′[E − g + (1− t)(H − hv)wp] + I ′[g] = 0 (13)
Note that these are both feasible since the ﬁrst derivative of all arguments of the utility
function are positive. The interior solutions to the agent’s allocation problem imply equal
marginal utilities between income and donations of money and time. Note that for an
impure altruist, the choice between donating money and time is based on equal warm
glow from both dimensions so that at the margin, (1− t)wpF = (1− t)wpI ′ = J ′.
After implicitly diﬀerentiating the equilibrium conditions w.r.t. wp and E, we arrive at
the following comparative statics:
dg
dE
=
F ′′J ′′
Ω
> 0
dhv
dE
=
(1− t)wpF ′′I ′′
Ω
> 0
dg
dwp
=
(1− t)F ′′(− (1− t)wpF ′ + (H − hv)J ′′)
Ω
> 0
dhv
dwp
=
(1− t)F ′′(F ′′ + (1 + (H − hv)(−(1− t)wp)I ′′)
Ω
 0
where Ω = (1− t)2w2pF ′′I ′′ + (F ′′ + I ′′)J ′′ > 0
The pure income eﬀect is evident in the comparative statics with respect to the endow-
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ment. The income eﬀect increases demand for both monetary donations and volunteering.
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase in private wages. The direct income eﬀect increases
demand for the “warm glow” of monetary donations. The eﬀect on total volunteering is
ambiguous. The increase in private wages has an income eﬀect that allows agents to oﬀer
greater volunteering time, but a substitution eﬀect away from volunteering.
The econometric methodology will therefore need to separate income and substitution
eﬀects, and will be outlined in the later section.
Observation 1 The agent’s choice is unaﬀected by both a matching donation and the
government provisioning of charity. There is no crowding out, or Hicksian price eﬀect.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of impurity, agents have no utility over the provision of charity.
Therefore, m and λ do not appear in the ﬁrst order conditions of the solution.4
dg
dλ
=
dhv
dλ
= 0 (14)
dg
dm
=
dhv
dm
= 0 (15)
3.4 Mixed Altruist
Consider now that any utility function of a mixed altruist can be represented by a weighted
function of a perfectly pure and perfectly impure altruist, so long as the utility over income
has the same form. It will be useful to consider altruists as possessing this scalable
function of impurity, which will be primed during the experiment. Let the degree of
impure altruism be α, and therefore, the weighted function is:
Umix = F [E−g+(H−hv)(1−t)wp]+(1−α)·G[g(1+m)+(H−hv)tλwp+hvwv]+α[I(g)+J(hv)]
(16)
4λ is a discrete variable throughout the rest of this paper, and technically not continuously diﬀer-
entiable, though it can be thought of as a continuous variable where the taxation revenue is partially
donated to charity. The intuition behind this result is unaﬀected by the discontinuity, and modelled this
way for parsimony.
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Deﬁnition 3.6. Deﬁne the cost of impurity as the amount of income the agent sacriﬁces
to give in the dimension that maximises their utility, rather than the value of the charity,
subject to the same level of charitable donation. It may also be deﬁned as what a pure
altruist would consider the deadweight loss of a choice. The cost of impurity is calculated
by
1. Observing the value generated to the charity by each subject Vˆ (gˆ, hˆv).
2. Determining the optimal decision of money and time, g∗,h∗v that would maximise
the subject’s income, Yi, subject to the same value of donation Vˆ .
3. Calculating the cost of this donation, C(g∗, h∗v)
4. Calculate the cost of the subject’s donation, C(gˆ, hˆv)
5. Cost of Impurity = C(gˆ, hˆv)− C(g∗, h∗v).
Since this is, by deﬁnition, income they chose not to be allocated to themselves, nor the
charity, by revealed preferences it must be the minimum amount which is given for impure
motivations.
Deﬁnition 3.7. Deﬁne the price of impurity as the value of the cost of impurity, per
dollar of value generated for the charity. This transformation is made to normalise the
proportion of impurity observed, in terms of the size of the overall donation. The price
of impurity is calculated by:
Price of Impurity =
C(gˆ, hˆv)− C(g∗, h∗v)
Vˆ
Proposition 3. The price of impurity is increasing in α.
Proof. Consider the case where:
(1 +m)(1− t)wp > wv and δ = 0 (17)
According to equation (17), volunteering time is ineﬃcient, and from Proposition 1 a
pure altruist must choose hv = 0 and g =
Vˆ
1+m
to provide any given level of charitable
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contribution, Vˆ . Given Vˆ , the income Y ∗ to the pure altruist (α = 0) is Y ∗ = E −
Vˆ
1+m
+H(1− t)wp. Consider now the choice made by any other agent with α > 0, whose
donation choice results in the the same Vˆ (we can only compare the price of impurity for
the same Vˆ ). She then chooses (g, hv) to maximise:
Umix = F [E−g+(H−hv)(1−t)wp]+(1−α)·G[g(1+m)+(H−hv)tλwp+hvwv]+α
(
I[g]+J [hv]
)
(18)
where
g(1 +m) + hvwv = Vˆ (19)
Let Y (α) = E − gˆ + (H − hˆv)(1− t)wp denote the income of an agent of preference α at
their utility maximising choice, (gˆ, hˆv).
The third Inada condition (4) mandates that for α > 0, hv > 0, and as such the maximum
income Y (α) that an altruist can obtain is strictly less than Y ∗. The income will be shown
to be continuously decreasing in α.
Since g(1 +m) + hvwv = V
∗,
g =
V ∗ − hvwv
1 +m
Substituting this identity into equation (18), an agent of preference α maximises:
F [E − V
∗ − hvwv
1 +m
+ (H − hv)(1− t)wp] + (1− α) ·G[V ∗] + α
(
I[
V ∗ − hvwv
1 +m
] + J [hv]
)
Given the Inada conditions, the optimal choice hv is interior, and the ﬁrst order condition
is:
F ′ ·
(
wv
1 +m
− (1− t)wp
)
+ αI ′
dg
dhv
+ αJ ′ = 0 (20)
And since
dg
dhv
= − wv
1 +m
under constraint (19).
The ﬁrst order condition (20) can be rearranged using the above comparative static to
yield:
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J ′ − I ′ wv
1+m
F ′
=
−wv
1+m
+ (1− t)wp
α
(21)
Given (1 +m)(1− t)wp > wv > 0, the RHS of equation (21) is positive and decreasing in
α. The remaining parameters are exogenous.
Consider the change on the LHS of this equation as a result of the change in α. The LHS
must fall as α rises for the condition to hold with equality. Since both derivatives are
positive, this requires J ′ to fall and I ′ to increase. Under the constraint (19), changes to
the choices g and hv must be in the opposite direction. Since both J and I are concave,
this requires hv to rise and g to fall.
Since a higher hv results in a lower net income to the agent, it follows that the cost of
impurity must increase in α, for any observed donation of value Vˆ . Therefore, for every
observed Vˆ , the price of impurity is higher. The proof for Case B and continuous λ
follows with trivial diﬀerences, and is not supplied for parsimony.
Proposition 4. The degree of crowding out is bounded ∈ (0, 1), and must be decreasing
in α ∀ α ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. The result follows as a corollary of Proposition 2 and equation (15). Crowding
out is positive but incomplete under pure altruism, and 0 under impure altruism. It
follows trivially therefore, that the greater the weighting on impure altruism in the utility
function, the smaller the degree of crowding out.
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3.5 Hypotheses
The predictions of the theoretical model will be tested empirically. The experiment will
involve two treatments. The ﬁrst will involve a pure priming of subjects, to decrease
the distribution of α compared to a baseline treatment. The second treatment will alter
the treatment of tax. The baseline treatment will have no donation to charity (λ = 0),
whereas in the second treatment, the tax will be wholly donated to charity (λ = 1).
Hypothesis 1. The price of impurity will be lower in a pure priming treatment.
Follows directly from Proposition 3. Agents will have heterogeneous α, but if the pure
prime successfully reduces α, the large sample properties will ensure the distribution of α
is lower, and therefore the average price of impurity will be lower under a pure priming.
Hypothesis 2. The degree of crowding out due to a government provisioning of charity
will be less than complete. The degree of crowding out will be higher in a pure priming
treatment.
Follows directly from Proposition 4, and the large sample properties argument above.
Hypothesis 3. Donations of money and time will be Hicksian substitutes.
Follows from Proposition 1, and equation (15).
Proposition 1 showed that for a pure altruist, g and hv must be perfect substitutes,
given that the donation choice completely depended on the cost of each good. Under
equation (15), an impure altruist treats the goods as neither substitutes nor complements.
Therefore, if α < 1, the goods must be Hicksian substitutes.
Hypothesis 4. The Hicksian cross price eﬀect should be greater in a pure priming
treatment. For example, the price eﬀect of the matching donation will be to increase
donations of money at the expense of donations of time.
This hypothesis is not conclusive, but is likely to hold from Hypothesis 3. The Hicksian
cross price eﬀect arises only due to the provision of the public good, which has a stronger
weighting under a lower α. The result may not hold, however, if the utility over the size
of the public good is suﬃciently concave, relative to the utility over the warm glow of
volunteering, which would result in a decrease in monetary donations.
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4 Experimental Design
4.1 Design Aims and Constraints
The aim of the experiment was to simulate volunteering work as closely as could be
reasonably achieved in an experimental setting. For this reason, the experiment was
conducted using genuine work, but in a laboratory where decisions could be manipulated
to estimate pure and impure motives. According to the taxonomy deﬁned by (?), the
experiment possessed qualities of both a lab experiment and a framed ﬁeld experiment.
Additional beneﬁts of a lab experiment are that it allows for variation in the private wage
oﬀered to agents to work rather than volunteer, which would undoubtedly be seen as
unorthodox in a ﬁeld experiment, and since the aim was to build a baseline model, absent
of any prosocial signalling eﬀects, the required privacy for this is made possible in a lab
environment.
The experiment was designed to satisfy the following key elements:
1. The subjects should complete a task of real value to the charity, and common work a
volunteer is likely to perform, dissimilarly to previous experiments on volunteering,
which have involved pressing keyboard letters as fast as possible (Ariely, Bracha, and
Meier, 2009), running on treadmills (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009), or remaining
present in the laboratory to elicit a monetary donation (Angner, Helms, Scott, and
Culver, 2009).
2. The subjects must have perfect information (and observable to the researcher) over
the value of their labour to the charity. This controls for the alternative hypothesis
that their volunteering decision is based on asymmetric or imperfect information
between the charity and the volunteer.
3. The task that subjects choose to perform, whether for a private wage or for the
public good, must be identical, to control for the alternative hypothesis that they
may choose an interior solution based on convex disutilities of diﬀerent labour tasks
(Handy and Katz, 2008).
4. The experiment should be able to robustly prove or disprove the impure altruism
hypothesis as a salient element in the giving or volunteering decision.
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5. If impure altruism is found, then the decisions should show the degree of pure
altruism remaining, including the substitutability of money and time.
6. The design of the experiment should control for, or mitigate as far as possible,
the hypothesis that agents make their decisions based on unsophistication, i.e., an
inability to understand what will maximise the charity’s payoﬀ.
7. The work performed, and decisions made, should be private at all times; the subjects
should not be able to observe each others work, or their decisions. This is required
to control for the eﬀects of prosocial signalling.
It was important to fulﬁll these elements, as the aim was to test a hedonic model of pure
and warm glow utility, net of any other eﬀects that may be responsible for the same
behaviour in the ﬁeld. The experiment was run at the Behavioural Laboratory in the
Merewether Building, located at the University of Sydney. The laboratory was set up
with a sequence of cubicles, each of them permanently divided so that the participants
could not see the actions or choices of the subjects behind or adjacent to them. Therefore,
each subject performed the experiment in privacy to control for any signalling or prosocial
motivations. Subjects were recruited randomly from a pool of university students, who
had previously indicated a willingness to be contacted about economic experiments. The
text of the invitation letter can be viewed in the Appendix. There was signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity amongst the subjects who participated in the experiment. The demographics of
participating students are summarised in Figure 10, in the Appendix.
4.2 Experiment Overview
The experiment was completed in conjunction with an existing charity, The African Foun-
dation For People In Need (henceforth, charity) and a private ﬁrm, Maha Aziz, Mortdale
Optometrist (henceforth, business). The charity mission statement and description pro-
vided to the participants is available in the Appendix.
The experiment required the subjects to choose how to allocate a) their money and b)
their time in a real-eﬀort task. During the time spent working for the business, they would
receive a piece-rate payment, but they would not receive any payment while working for
the charity. However, value for the charity was purely dependent on the output of the
volunteer, and as such, volunteering could likewise be considered a piece-rate task.
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The experiment involved a real-eﬀort task, the folding and addressing of envelopes for
mailouts. Subjects were required to choose how much time to allocate to working for the
charity and for the business, under an identical task. The subject would only receive a
private payment for working for the business. Whilst such a task is common to volunteer
work, and simple enough for any subject to perform, there may be some variance in eﬃ-
ciency. The idiosyncratic distribution of subjects’ abilities was unobserved, and it is quite
likely that the subjects themselves were unaware of their own eﬃciencies, which would
have aﬀected both the beneﬁt to the charity and the opportunity cost of volunteering.
To control for this, each subject’s productivity in envelope folding was initially measured
whilst working for a high wage at the start of the experiment.
Thus far, the theoretical discussion predicts that the giving or volunteering decision is
based on the income, own-price and cross-price eﬀects of giving in each dimension. Each
subject was required to make decisions over money and time for 24 possible conditions
(Table 2), where each condition was a permutation of these parameters. After making
these decisions, one of the conditions was randomly chosen to be carried out for the
remainder of the experiment. Eliciting the subjects’ responses before the condition was
randomised allowed a panel of data to be created, which contained the within-subject
variation in the design. Since one of the decisions was chosen randomly after all decisions
were made, each decision was incentivised for truthful reporting of preferences.
The price of giving monetarily was induced via a matching donation to the charity from the
experimental budget. This also ensured participants could not arbitrage the experiment
by retaining the income and donating afterwards, to take advantage of tax-deductability.
The price of volunteering was induced in opportunity cost terms, the wage rate for pri-
vate labour. In order that the income and price eﬀects could be isolated, a non-labour
endowment was also given to subjects. The value of volunteer labour was tied down by
the amount the charity would pay for the remaining envelopes not completed during the
experiment. Therefore, the value of volunteer labour could not be varied, as this would
have involved deception of the subjects. Since the value was tied down as a replacement
cost of labour, both the experimenter and the subject shared perfect information about
their labour value to the charity.
The value of volunteer labour to charity (wv) was ﬁxed at $0.30 per envelope. Each
decision had a singular dimension that was more eﬃcient at increasing the provision of
the charitable good. In two thirds of the decisions, the more eﬃcient dimension was to give
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money. In a third, the more eﬃcient was to give time. The weighting towards monetary
giving was deliberate to produce the most variation, as the ﬁeld data consistently shows
an inherent bias to giving time.
Table 2
List of conditions, within subject
Cond
Endowment Private Wage wp Tax t Matching m Eﬃcient PG
E ($) ($ per envelope) (%) donation (%) dimension (binary)
1 15 0.10 0 50 Volunteering Time
2 15 0.10 0 100 Volunteering Time
3 15 0.10 25 50 Volunteering Time
4 15 0.10 25 100 Volunteering Time
5 15 0.30 0 50 Monetary Donation
6 15 0.30 0 100 Monetary Donation
7 15 0.30 25 50 Monetary Donation
8 15 0.30 25 100 Monetary Donation
9 15 0.45 0 50 Monetary Donation
10 15 0.45 0 100 Monetary Donation
11 15 0.45 25 50 Monetary Donation
12 15 0.45 25 100 Monetary Donation
13 25 0.10 0 50 Volunteering Time
14 25 0.10 0 100 Volunteering Time
15 25 0.10 25 50 Volunteering Time
16 25 0.10 25 100 Volunteering Time
17 25 0.30 0 50 Monetary Donation
18 25 0.30 0 100 Monetary Donation
19 25 0.30 25 50 Monetary Donation
20 25 0.30 25 100 Monetary Donation
21 25 0.45 0 50 Monetary Donation
22 25 0.45 0 100 Monetary Donation
23 25 0.45 25 50 Monetary Donation
24 25 0.45 25 100 Monetary Donation
4.3 Treatments
The experiment utilised a 2x2 between-subject design. The ﬁrst treatment framed the
charitable giving and volunteering decision from pure motivation, aligning the agent’s
utility with provision of the public good. The second treatment manipulated the tax on
private wages to measure the level of crowding out, and how this would interact with the
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pure framing.
The pure framing was manipulated by modifying the certiﬁcates of thanks that subjects
would receive at the conclusion of the experiment (provided in the Appendix). In the
baseline treatment, subjects received a certiﬁcate thanking them for their donations of
money and time. The certiﬁcate showed how much they had sacriﬁced during the ex-
periment, in separable terms of dollars and minutes. The certiﬁcate only showed the
amount sacriﬁced by the participant; it did not include the matching donation or the
value of the volunteer labour in dollar terms. It was therefore commensurate with the
motivations of the impure altruist, where the warm glow is derived from what the indi-
vidual has sacriﬁced. Certiﬁcates of thanks ordinarily supplied by charities specify the
size of the monetary donation, or the task that the volunteer has performed. Charities do
not customarily thank volunteers by imputing the value of their volunteered time; such
behaviour, it is expected, would be seen as highly unorthodox, hence common practice
makes this treatment the baseline.
In the pure treatment, the certiﬁcate was framed in terms of the value to the charity.
The certiﬁcate ﬁrstly thanked the subject for their donations of money and time. It
then explicitly listed the value generated for the charity, aggregating the money and time
donations. This value depended on the amount donated, the time and eﬃciency of the
subject’s volunteer labour and the matching donation. Therefore, the decision was framed
in terms of the value generated for the charity, rather than the amount sacriﬁced by the
subject. It was expected that subjects under the pure prime would behave more like pure
altruists, and therefore give to charity in the more eﬃcient dimension.
To enhance the saliency of the framing, a preview of the certiﬁcate updated in real time
as the subjects made their 24 decisions. The information provided on both certiﬁcates
was also visible elsewhere on the screen at all times.
The second treatment involved the tax on private labour. In the baseline treatment, the
tax operated normally, being a value received neither by the agent nor the charity. In
the alternate treatment, the money raised by the tax was compulsorily donated to the
charity.
As discussed in the theoretical section, a taxed compulsory donation to charity should
crowd out donations more strongly under the pure priming. Since an impure altruist
derives utility only from what they choose to sacriﬁce, their donating decision remains
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unaﬀected by a compulsory tax. Therefore any form of tax could only reduce donations
purely via an income eﬀect, and there would be no diﬀerence between the two taxation
treatments. This relies on the assumption that an impure altruist does not derive a warm
glow utility over an amount that was taken from them by force, since it did not involve
a willing sacriﬁce.5
Table 3
Treatments were given under a 2x2 design, with a balanced panel
Sample Size Baseline Pure
Ω1(α) Ω2(α)
Regular tax 25 25
λ = 0
Tax compulsorily donated to charity 25 25
λ = 1
4.4 Experimental Procedures
The subjects were informed that they would be participating in an economics experiment
on decision-making, lasting approximately 90 minutes. Upon entering the laboratory,
subjects were randomised into each treatment by the cubicle they chose to sit at. Ac-
cordingly, in every session there were an approximately equal number of subjects in each
treatment. This ensured that no spurious results were found by any one session being
over-represented by a particular class of student, such as the possibility of certain units
of study ﬁnishing just prior to the experiment, or a particular type of student attending
on a particular day of the week.
The subjects were informed that they could leave the experiment at any time before its
conclusion, but would not be paid if they chose to do so. Once seated, they were given
the following instructions:
You are participating in an experiment on decision-making. The entire amount
of time the experiment should take is 90 minutes...During the experiment, you
will be asked to make a series of decisions that will beneﬁt yourself and/or
a charity that is described on the reverse of this page. You will be paid in
5This assumption is standard under Andreoni’s warm glow model.
31
cash at the end of the experiment according to the choices that you made
during the experiment. Donations you may choose to make during the ex-
periment will be made by an aggregate cheque. This can be veriﬁed from
19th August 2011 by contacting Professor Robert Slonim by email
at robert.slonim@sydney.edu.au, or in person at Merewether Room 348.
Please turn over the page to familiarise yourself with the charity.6 After you
have read the information about the charity, please turn on your computer
monitor to begin.
Each subject was asked to initially address, insert and fold as many envelopes as they
could in an initial four-minute trial. As a result, both the experimenter and the subject
had full information over their own productivity. To ensure that their true ability would
be observed, subjects were told that they had a chance of receiving signiﬁcant wages in
the ﬁrst four minutes. Each participant would have a 1 in 10 chance of receiving $2 for
every envelope they correctly completed in the ﬁrst four minutes..7 Since earnings from
this task would aﬀect the endowment of each agent, and present a source of heterogeneity,
this lottery was determined at the conclusion of the experiment. The number folded was
entered into the experimental software, so that the software could later calculate and
report on the expected private wage and value to the charity for each individual.
The productivity control task was necessary. There was signiﬁcant variance in the folding
speeds observed between subjects in the initial four minute task, where μ = 4.3 and
σ2 = 2.4. The number folded in four minutes was also a highly accurate predictor of the
overall productivity observed during the remainder of the experiment, as seen in Table 4.
After the initial four-minute folding task had ended, the subjects then read the following
instructions on their monitors.
In this stage of the experiment you are going to be asked to make a total of
24 decisions. For each decision, you will choose what to do with both your
available money and your available time. Once you have made all your deci-
sions, one of them, all with equal likelihood of being chosen, will be randomly
selected, and will determine what you do for the remainder of the experiment.
The random choice will be made by electronic die-roll so that the choices you
6The information sheet on the charity prepared for participants can be found in Supplementary Ma-
terials.
7Risk attitudes would have also aﬀected the eﬀort, but they would have been relatively minor.
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Table 4
Robustness check of the task to determine eﬃciency.
( 1 )
Total Envelopes in 40min
Envelopes in 4min 10.739∗∗∗
(0.262)
R2 0.946
adj.R2 0.945
N 100
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ (p ≤ 0.1), ∗∗ (p ≤ 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p ≤ 0.01)
make will have no impact on the outcome of which decision is chosen for you
to play out. Every decision is anonymous and your choice will not be observed
by those around you. In each decision you have an opportunity to make a do-
nation of both money and time to AFFPIN, and an opportunity to generate
money for yourself. The money you generate for yourself will be paid to you
in cash at the end of the experiment. You will also be able to donate some
of your available money to AFFPIN during the experiment if you choose to.
You will have a total of 40 minutes to allocate between working for yourself
and for AFFPIN.
The subjects were then presented with instructions on the money allocation (giving)
decision:
You will receive an amount of $15 or $25, referred to as your ’endowment’,
depending on the random condition that you are assigned to. You can donate
any amount from this endowment up to $15 to AFFPIN. Every dollar that
you donate will generate a matching gift from the experiment, of either 50% or
100%, depending on the condition. [Examples suppressed.] You may donate
anything from $0 to $15. You will be able to keep the remaining amount that
you do not donate from your endowment, and from any income earned during
the experiment.
The maximum payment was set at $15 since the ﬁnal income available depended on the
number of envelopes folded, and was therefore determined at the conclusion of the exper-
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iment. It would have been possible to allow higher donations in the higher endowment
setting, but this was undesirable, as the framing of the decision would not have been held
constant. The degree of censoring was relatively minor, as less than 10% of decisions
involved a monetary donation of the maximum.
The subjects were then presented with instructions on the time allocation (volunteering)
decision.
You have 40 minutes of time to use to work for yourself and/or the charity. You
may choose to donate some of your time to AFFPIN. AFFPIN is conducting
a mailout which requires the folding of envelopes. The remaining envelopes
that are not completed during the experiment the charity will pay for to be
folded at a cost of $0.30 per envelope. Based on the speed at which you folded
envelopes at the beginning of the experiment, your time is worth $v per hour
to the charity. You do not receive payment for the time volunteered for the
charity.
If you choose to work for yourself, you will be folding envelopes for a private
business. You will generate a wage of either $0.10, $0.20 or $0.30 per envelope
folded while working for yourself, depending on the condition you are assigned
to. Based on the speed at which you folded envelopes at the beginning of the
experiment you will be able to generate a wage of $x, $y, and $z per hour in
each condition respectively. These wages will be paid to you at the conclusion
of the experiment.
The wage generated during the time spent working for yourself only may
be taxed during the experiment, at a rate of 0% or 25%, depending on the
condition to which you are randomly assigned. You will only generate income
for yourself from the untaxed proportion of your wage. [Conditional on
treatment: The taxed proportion of your wage will be allocated to
the charity.] [Examples suppressed.]
You will receive a certiﬁcate of thanks from AFFPIN at the completion of the
experiment for your donation of money and time. A preview of this certiﬁcate
will appear on the right hand side of the screen as you update your decision.
You will receive the certiﬁcate that corresponds to the choices made in the
condition you are randomly assigned to.
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This concluded the instructions given to the participants. The subjects were then pre-
sented with an example decision screen, which trained them in understanding how the
decisions worked to beneﬁt themselves and the charity to varying degrees. Subjects were
asked to make decisions that would satisfy a list of diﬀerent criteria. For example, for
one criterion, subjects were told to allocate their time so that the value of their time to
the charity, and the income received to themselves, were equal. As they updated their
decisions, the relevant metrics which were aﬀected were also highlighted on screen. The
criteria chosen to be fulﬁlled subtly highlighted the fact that certain choices (such as vol-
unteering some time and donating some money) could be dominated in eﬃciency terms,
e.g., by working more for oneself and donating more of that money to charity.
Subjects were not able to continue with the experiment until they had demonstrated
they understood the choices by passing all of the criteria required. All subjects were
able to pass the decision screen, though eight asked for assistance in understanding the
instructions, which was given by an experimental assistant. The participants then made
24 decisions across 6 screens (available in the Appendix), and were allowed to move
forward and back between decisions. The ordering of the screens which appeared was
determined randomly, to control for any aggregate order eﬀects. For example, if subjects
anchor toward the ﬁrst decision they made in subsequent decisions, and fail to adjust to
subsequent conditions completely, their choice will be partly determined by their ﬁrst,
violating the choice independence condition. Nearly all the participating subjects chose
to move between decision screens. As expected, tests for any order eﬀect failed to reject
the null hypothesis of zero eﬀect.
Once all decisions were made, the condition that would be played out by the subjects
was determined on-screen via an electronic die roll. The screen then displayed the rele-
vant information, and the time chosen to be spent working for the business and for the
charity in the selected condition. To maintain the integrity of anonymous choices and to
avoid signalling eﬀects, the task was self-monitored from this point onward. A stopwatch
appeared on screen, which informed the subjects of the time they had remaining to work
for the charity, and then for the business. When the time for each task ended, the screen
ﬂashed to alert each subject. Once the task was complete, the software directed them to
a survey. The survey was designed to collect metrics on demographic characteristics that
may aﬀect giving and volunteering. A summary of these demographics is given in the
Appendix.
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5 Results
The results section of this thesis proceeds in four parts. First, consideration is given to
checking the basic hypotheses and the overall eﬀects of the treatments. The aggregated
data conﬁrms that the subjects behaved according to the hypotheses of the “mixed al-
truist” deﬁned in the theoretical section, and that the between-subject treatments are
signiﬁcant. Reduced form evidence of the existence of both pure and impure altruism is
given. The following section estimates the time or money donation decision with reduced
form econometric models. The ﬁnal section then speciﬁes and estimates a structural
model of utility from the microfoundations given in the theoretical section.
5.1 Overview of Hypotheses
The aggregate decisions made by subjects in the experiment were in line with the a priori
expectations outlined in the theoretical section. The conditional means for donations of
money and time, across variations in income and taxation, and between treatments, are
outlined in Table 5.
The assumption that donors are motivated by both pure and impure desires is well sup-
ported. The total level of charity generated under a compulsorily donated tax is higher
than in the baseline, suggesting there is an incomplete crowding out of voluntary do-
nations. Therefore, an increase in the provision of charity that does not come from a
sacriﬁce by the giver is seen as inferior to a donation of their own accord. The eﬀect of
matching donations is relatively small, as a doubling of the matching donation increases
the level of monetary donation by approximately one-ﬁfth. These two facts are consistent
with the existence of diminishing utility to the giver from the provision of the charitable
good, and to warm glow eﬀects.
The pure income eﬀects on donations are captured by the diﬀerence in giving between the
low and high endowment. The response of a monetary donation is in the expected direc-
tion, and close to unitary income- elastic, whereas the volunteering response is relatively
income inelastic.
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Table 5
Aggregated summary statistics
Aggregation Money Time Total value Income Income Ave cost of Ave price
Donation ($) Donation to charity kept sacriﬁced impurity of impurity
Between Subjects
Baseline 6.07 17.0 17.36 20.96 9.90 3.89 0.23
Pure Prime 5.60 12.9 15.53 21.94 8.18 2.47 0.17
Regular Tax 6.00 15.4 15.64 21.62 9.39 3.03 0.21
Tax to Charity 5.68 14.5 17.25 21.28 8.69 3.34 0.20
Baseline, Regular Tax 6.15 16.2 16.16 21.32 9.88 3.69 0.24
Baseline, Tax to Charity 5.99 17.7 18.56 20.60 9.91 4.10 0.22
Pure, Regular Tax 5.84 14.5 15.11 21.91 8.90 2.36 0.17
Pure, Tax to Charity 5.36 11.2 15.95 21.97 7.46 2.58 0.17
Within Subjects
Low Wage 4.33 20.2 15.19 17.58 6.12 3.03 0.18
Medium Wage 6.02 13.9 16.51 21.41 9.69 1.80 0.13
High Wage 7.15 10.6 17.64 25.35 11.30 4.71 0.31
Low Endowment 4.45 13.0 13.49 18.32 7.17 2.60 0.20
High Endowment 7.23 16.8 19.40 24.58 10.91 3.77 0.22
No Tax 6.18 13.7 15.10 22.46 9.52 3.50 0.24
25% Tax 5.49 16.1 17.79 20.44 8.55 2.86 0.17
50% Match 5.32 15.5 14.24 21.83 8.66 2.88 0.20
100% Match 6.35 14.3 18.65 21.07 9.42 3.48 0.21
μ 5.84 14.9 16.45 21.45 9.04 3.18 0.20
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Variations in the private wage rate contain both income and substitution eﬀects for vol-
unteering, in opposing directions. As the private wage rate increases, income increases
whilst simultaneously making volunteering more costly. The income eﬀect notwithstand-
ing, the relatively short amount of time spent in the lab suggests any income eﬀect should
be dominated by the substitution eﬀect. The halving of volunteering rates between the
low and high wage conditions conﬁrms this.
The cross-price eﬀects suggest that donations of money and time are imperfect substitutes.
The existence of a higher matching donation on monetary donations reduces the amount
of time spent volunteering. A higher wage (the opportunity cost of volunteering) increases
monetary donations. Neither eﬀect was, however, signiﬁcant enough to push subjects into
choosing corner sets.
Figure 3
Total voluntary sacriﬁce in each treatment, with standard errors.
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The eﬀects of the between-subject treatments will now be considered. In the treatment
where taxation revenue is compulsorily donated to charity, it is expected that the amount
that agents voluntarily sacriﬁce to contribute to the charitable good will be lower. This is,
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however, contingent on agents being signiﬁcantly motivated by pure rather than impure
altruism. Therefore, under the pure prime, the degree of crowding out should be stronger.
As seen in Figure 3, the degree of crowding out is very pronounced under the pure priming,
but negligible under the impure.
The pure prime must also diminish the motivation to give, as agents are willing to give
up almost 20% less income to contribute to the public good whilst in this treatment.
This does not necessarily reduce the provision of the public good. If an agent is impurely
motivated,, in attempting to maximise their own warm glow they are likely to diminish
the provision of charity in attempting to maximise their own warm glow. The more the
agent behaves in this way, the lower the level of charity raised for a given level of sacriﬁce.
If the pure prime is eﬀective, the agent’s objective to increase the level of charitable
provisioning will dominate the warm glow eﬀect, and the overall provision of charity may
be closer to equal than the previous graph would suggest. This is the case, as shown in
Figure 4. It is apparent that both treatments are eﬀective, individually and jointly.
Figure 4
Total value to charity in each treatment, with standard errors.
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5.2 Pure and Impure Eﬀects
The asynchronous relationship between the sacriﬁces made by each donor and the amount
raised for charity implies that donors must be paying for something that does not increase
the provision of the charity. This is quite clearly described by impure altruism. The
following section will estimate the price that donors are paying for their impure eﬀects,
as deﬁned in the theoretical section.
The dependent variable, Price of Impurity, can be considered to be the amount of income
each subject was willing to sacriﬁce, per dollar of total value given to the charity, in
order to give in the dimensions which maximised their own utility. A formal deﬁnition is
provided in Section 3.4. For two-thirds of the decisions made by each subject, the most
eﬀective charitable dimension was for the subject to work for themselves, and then to
donate money to the charity. For the other third, the most eﬀective dimension was to
volunteer their time to the charity.
The giving motivation of the subject, however, is assumed to be only partly due to the
motive of increasing the value of the public good. A subject who possesses both pure
and impure motives, and has diminishing warm glow from donating money and donating
time, is likely to donate in both dimensions to maximise their own utility. In other words,
it is the shadow price of impurity.
We construct kernel density functions for the shadow price of impurity, per subject. There
was signiﬁcant heterogeneity amongst subjects in the baseline, and a relatively normal
distribution of impure eﬀects is observed. The pure framing shifts the density function to
the left, as shown in Figure 6. This implies that income can be more eﬃciently distributed
between the charity and the donor, with a lower level of loss, if the charity is able to frame
the donation decision from a pure perspective. In this experiment, altering the framing
of the certiﬁcate that agents would receive was suﬃcient to do this.
40
Figure 5
Average cost of impurity in each treatment, with standard errors.
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Figure 6
Conditional kernel density functions for the shadow price of impurity
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This shadow price is regressed on both the between-subjects treatments and the de-
mographic factors of students entering the lab. All subjects received the same level of
information in each treatment, and only the certiﬁcate was used to prime their pure and
impure motivations. Therefore, a signiﬁcant response in the variable as a result of the
pure prime would strengthen the hypothesis that subjects chose ineﬃcient methods of
donating due to (diminishing) warm glow eﬀects.
To control for subject ineﬃciency (not being able to calculate the most eﬃcient donating
dimension), the beneﬁt and cost to the subject was displayed on the screen at all times
while they updated their decisions. Further, the following regressions control for factors
that are strong proxies for sophistication in economic decision-making, such as tertiary
entrance scores and university majors. Any remaining variance that is explained by the
prime and demographic factors then serves as evidence for impure eﬀects. Regardless,
any unsophistication is distributed randomly across each treatment.
The individual data points observed on the Price of Impurity include severe outliers,
which could potentially bias the results. This can be corrected by taking the average
price of impurity for each subject, therefore reducing the sample size, or by an alternative
estimation process which is robust to outliers. Two such models are estimated. The ﬁrst
is an ordinary OLS regression on the average price of impurity per subject. The second
includes all measured data points, but uses the M-estimator (Huber, 2005) to construct
appropriate weights on outliers.
These results lend support to Hypothesis 1. The eﬀect of the pure priming was statistically
signiﬁcant and economically very strong. As a result of the priming, subjects were willing
to pay 25% less for impure eﬀects. The results are consistent with also in line with
expectations over demographics, since the amount of money donation outside the lab
(generally the most eﬀective at increasing charity in the ﬁeld) is a strong predictor of
lower impurity– every $100 donated outside the lab reduces the expected amount paid by
10%.
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Table 6
Price Paid for Impurity, Per Subject and Per Decision
.
By Subject, OLS By Subject, OLS By Decision, WLS
Price of Impurity Price of Impurity Price of Impurity
μbaseline 0.23 0.23 0.23
Constant 0.426∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pure Prime -0.071∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.087) (0.026) (0.028)
Survey Data
Times Donated Money 0.003
(0.862)
Money Donated ($100s) -0.026∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.001)
Hrs Volunteered 0.000
(0.491)
Female 0.022
(0.610)
Diﬃculty Understanding -0.047
(0.179)
Economics Major -0.172∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.038) (0.001)
Business Major -0.118∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.036) (0.009)
Math/Sci/Eng Major -0.117∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.022) (0.042) (0.012)
Arts Major -0.037
(0.537)
ATAR/UAI (70-100) -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002∗
(0.618) (0.001) (0.080)
Hrs Paid Work -0.002
(0.320)
Household Income ($10,000s) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0) (0.008)
Worthwhile Charity (1-7) -0.007
(0.486)
Survey Impure Proxy (1-7) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
R2 0.427 0.4 0.11
adj.R2 0.291 0.34 0.10
N 100 100 2400
p-values in parentheses
Standard Errors are robust, clustered by individual in third model
∗ (p ≤ 0.1), ∗∗ (p ≤ 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p ≤ 0.01) 43
Students who took an economics major were similarly found to pay much less for impure
eﬀects. This is likely to be an experimental demand eﬀect, as such students are trained
in recognising dominant strategies during experiments, which in itself may be a “pure
prime”. Note that the eﬀect is much smaller for those who study mathematics and
science (i.e., of the same mathematical sophistication). The price is only slightly related
to subject sophistication, as the tertiary entrance score of students has a minor eﬀect;
moving from a UAI of 70 to 100 has a smaller eﬀect than the pure priming, demonstrating
the robustness of the theory. Sophistication was not required to be able to understand
the experiment, since all calculations of the income received, and the value to the charity,
updated in real time as each subject altered their decision.
Despite women giving higher amounts throughout the experiment, the level of impurity
between the genders was not found to be statistically diﬀerent. However, subjects who
were raised in a family with high household income were found to behave much more im-
purely. An extra $100 000 of household family income (1.5 standard deviations) increased
the expected amount paid for warm glow eﬀects by approximately 40%. It is likely that
households with lower incomes have been made more attuned to the need for public good
giving. For those who have been conditioned by a salubrious upbringing, on the other
hand, donations are better modelled as “warm glow” consumption goods.
The survey included a question designed to be a proxy for the scale of impurity brought to
the lab by each subject: “How would you feel if you donated money or time to a charity,
and later discovered that it was mostly unsuccessful at improving the welfare of its aid
recipients? (1 = Wished I had not donated at all, 7 = No less glad that I had)”.8 The
intuition is that the less ones aversion is to an unsuccessful charity venture, the higher the
warm glow of the act of giving, relative to the value of the public good. This was found
to be extremely statistically and economically robust (will do the check to see whether
it is just inﬂuenced by the priming). The remaining survey variables designed to proxy
impurity were not signiﬁcant beyond this eﬀect.
8Table 11, in the Appendix, shows that the answer to this question is not correlated with the prime.
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5.3 Donations of Money and Time
The following section speciﬁes and estimates demand curves for donations of money, and
donations of time.
It is now evident that the average donor is best modelled as a mixed altruist, both purely
and impurely motivated in her choice of donations. Therefore her demand for donations of
money and time {g, hv}, are functions of her endowment, private wage, tax, the matching
gift, and the treatment of her tax as a compulsory donation, (E,wp, wv, t,m, δ), which
correspond to the variables altered in the experiment, listed in Table 2. Yet these variables
do not have clear and generalisable interpretations in economic theory. As such, the
following transformations are made:
Total potential income (Y ) = E +H · wp · (1− t)
Price of volunteering (pv) = wp · (1− t)
Price of giving (pg) =
1
1 +m
The ﬁrst transformation constructs the total potential income available to the agents, and
can be considered their budget set from which they eﬀectively “consume” donations of
money and volunteered time. Using potential income is unorthodox, but is conveniently
constructed purely of exogenous factors, whereas actual income is a function of available
time minus volunteered hours, H − hv, and suﬀers from an obvious endogeneity problem.
The second term is therefore the cost to their budget set of each minute of volunteered
time, the after-tax private wage rate. The third term constructs a “price” of giving money
to the charity by measuring the eﬀective cost of increasing the provision of charity by one
unit.
Each decision that involves a compulsorily taxed donation to the charity has an iden-
tical condition that does not involve the tax, as shown in Table 2. This allows for the
construction of two variables which would represent complete crowding out of donations.
The coeﬃcient of these variables measure the degree of crowding out, between 0 and 1,
where 1 represents crowding out that would oﬀset the contribution entirely, from each of
money and time. The variables satisfy the exogeneity condition because they are prede-
termined, presuming each decision is independent. These ﬁve variables discussed make
up the regressors of the following models of demand and will be denoted X˜it.
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A joint Multivariate estimation9 is used to allow for cross correlation of error terms, since
subjects make a joint decision involving both money and time for every condition.10 If
subjects have heterogeneous preferences over donations of money and time, there is likely
to be negative cross correlation between the errors of the two estimations. If instead,
subjects have homogeneous preferences over donations of money and time, but diﬀerent
levels of altruism overall, there should be positive cross correlation between errors of the
two estimations.
Since each subject makes 24 decisions, a Least Squares Dependent Variable (Fixed Eﬀects)
estimator is used across the panel, where the FE matrix is denoted D˜i. Further, as there
are many choices of 0 donation, a joint Multivariate Tobit estimation is employed with left-
censoring and cross correlation of errors. Therefore, the estimation method is constructed
as follows:
[
git
hvit
]
= D˜i
′γ + X˜it′β + 	˜it
where E
[
	˜it
]
= E
[
	itg
	ith
]
= 0˜ and V ar
[
	˜it
]
=
[
σ2g ρghσgσh
ρghσgσh σ
2
h
]
The previous sections demonstrated that the treatment of the pure priming aﬀected all
endogenous variables in the model beyond a simple change in intercept. By altering
the desire to increase the public good, it will also change the elasticity of donations
with respect to variables such as the matching gift and the cross price eﬀects. As such,
the parsimonious method of running a pooled regression with a dummy variable for the
treatment is a functional misspeciﬁcation, and does not allow many conclusions to be
drawn. Therefore, estimations will be run separately for each of the treatments with and
without the pure prime.
The model is speciﬁed as a linear-log model, as this provided the best overall ﬁt. Therefore
the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the marginal unitary change in the dependent vari-
able (scaled by 100) for a 1% change in the value of the dependent variable.11 The results
are presented in Table 7. Regressions without ﬁxed eﬀects and including demographic
9Also referred to as Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations
10Breusch-Pagan tests for independence of errors rejected the null hypothesis with a p-value < 0.001.
11In the Tobit model, this is the unconditional marginal eﬀect.
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Table 7
Donation Choices, Money and Time (Separated by Treatment)
Baseline Baseline Pure Prime Pure Prime
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Donated Money (g)
Constant -24.86∗∗∗ -27.02∗∗∗ -27.25∗∗∗ -36.91∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Total Income) 8.314∗∗∗ 9.129∗∗∗ 7.027∗∗∗ 10.02∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Price of Giving) -2.654∗∗∗ -3.040∗∗∗ -4.489∗∗∗ -6.229∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Price of Volunteering) -0.382∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗ -0.298∗ -0.389∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.061) (0.066)
Crowding Out -0.064 -0.0750 -0.316∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.321) (0.003) (0.001)
Donated Time (hv)
Constant -33.68∗∗∗ -46.70∗∗∗ -24.24∗∗∗ -31.89∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Log(Total Income) 11.71∗∗∗ 12.69∗∗∗ 8.055∗∗∗ 9.846∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Price of Giving) 3.404∗∗ 3.756∗ 4.678∗∗∗ 5.986∗
(0.015) (0.090) (0.001) (0.091)
Log(Price of Volunteering) -9.448∗∗∗ -10.40∗∗∗ -8.759∗∗∗ -11.51∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crowding Out -0.0857 -0.330∗∗∗ -0.131 -0.393∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.101) (0.170) (0.000)
ln(σ11) 0.862
∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗
ln(σ22) 1.936
∗∗∗ 2.021∗∗∗ 2.046∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗∗
ρ12 -0.274
∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
R2 0.68 0.76
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200
p-values in parentheses, Standard Errors cannot be clustered under cross-correlations of
error terms, but were found to have minor eﬀects when included in regular OLS models.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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variables are supplied in the Appendix.
Donations of time are relatively income inelastic, as a 1% change in total potential in-
come has an expected marginal increase in volunteer time of 0.13 minutes in the baseline
treatment, and 0.10 minutes under the pure priming, which is approximately 0.6% of the
average time donation. This is in line with the ﬁeld data estimate found by Menchik and
Weisbrod (1987). Donations of money appear to be income elastic, as the same change
results in an expected increase in monetary donations of $0.09 in the baseline, and $0.10
in the pure priming, implying an elasticity at the mean levels of approximately 1.5%.
The eﬀect of the matching donation was predicted to be stronger under the pure prim-
ing, according to the theoretical model discussed. These results support this hypothesis.
Consider the own-price eﬀect on donations of money. It is found to be very statistically
signiﬁcant under both treatments, but the eﬀect of the matching is price-inelastic in the
baseline model, but price elastic at the mean in the pure priming (0.5% and 1.1% at the
mean donations levels). The baseline eﬀect is weaker than the 1.3% price elasticity found
by Feldstein and Taylor (1976).12 Further, the cross-price eﬀect of monetary donations,
on donations of time, becomes 60% stronger under the pure priming, demonstrating that
the two donations have become more substitutable.
The price of volunteering has an inelastic eﬀect on donations across all treatments. How-
ever, the price of volunteering has an estimated negative marginal eﬀect with respect to
donations of money. It has the opposite sign to the cross price eﬀect on donations of
time, and would suggest that whilst donations of money are a gross substitute for volun-
teering, donations of time are a gross complement for donations of money- an inherent
contradiction. This is likely due to the fact that the variable, Total Potential Income, is
constructed so that the endowment and wage earnings are treated identically. There is
experimental evidence that donations during experiments are more readily parted with if
the money was given to the subject as an endowment, rather than earned (List, 2007).
Therefore, the estimated price of volunteering could be eﬀected by the extent that at
which subjects discount giving from earned income, relative to “gifted” income. The
structural estimation method in the following section will be much less aﬀected by this,
and better suited to measuring substitutability.
12There is however, a diﬀerence under where the price of giving is constructed by the tax-deductible
price. When the donor sacriﬁces his money, she may get a warm glow over the entire donation, even
though the taxable proportion is returned later in the year as a deduction, and therefore not truly
sacriﬁced. A price eﬀect may be present over the warm glow as well as over increasing the public good.
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Hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed by the coeﬃcients of crowding out. Crowding out in the baseline
treatment is of the correct sign and reasonable magnitude, but statistically insigniﬁcant,
which suggests that whilst some agents may be crowding out, on average, taxed donations
are not crowding out voluntary donations in a signiﬁcant way. The degree of crowding out
is however quite signiﬁcant under the pure priming. Across the total value of money and
time donations, the degree of crowding out as measured by OLS is 44% complete, and 75%
complete under the Tobit speciﬁcation (found by adding the coeﬃcients on the crowding
out parameters of money and time). The large diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is due to the fact
that the OLS statistic is biased by agents who chose to donate no (or very little) time or
money before the tax was introduced, and therefore their optimal choice of donation was
less than 0 after the compulsory tax was introduced. Therefore, the degree of crowding
out is 75% under the pure prime (35% from money, and 39% from volunteering). Both
treatments demonstrate that in the absence of the endogenous response of charitable
fundraising, a government policy of taxation and subsidisation would lead to an increase
in the provision of charity overall.
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5.4 Structural Model of Utility
The prior section established the reduced form evidence for the existence of both pure
and impure altruism. There are limitations to the approach. These limitations can be
addressed by structurally estimating the parameters of the utility function. We specify a
very general functional form to structurally estimate the utility of charitable giving.
One such limitation is in trying to establish the link between donations of money and of
time. The cross-price eﬀect measured in the reduced form model contains both income and
substitution eﬀects. The scale of the cross-price eﬀect suggests that there is substitution
beyond income eﬀects, and that the goods should be net substitutes, once any income
eﬀects are netted of. A deﬁnitive conclusion regarding the extent of substitutability could
be much more richly determined in a structural model.
While there is already reduced form evidence of signiﬁcant pure and impure altruism
which can be reconciled with the original theoretical model, there are still useful questions
which have not been addressed. The ﬁrst is in regards to where altruists are deriving their
utility, on average. How much utility do agents derive from warm glow eﬀects compared
to the pure motivation of increasing the public good? A government instituting policies
pertaining to charitable giving should be concerned with this question, if their aim is not
only to maximise the charitable public good, but also the welfare of donors. A donation
that is acquired compulsorily may not provide its constituents the same utility as an equal
donation made of their own accord.
Secondly, we wish to isolate the actual price donors pay for consuming warm glow eﬀects.
To understand this, it is useful to imagine the consumer buying separate goods. The
ﬁrst is purely a gift to the charity, worth exactly the purchase amount, but is in itself
incapable of generating any warm glow eﬀects. The second good is a consumption good
that generates the identical warm glow eﬀect as a monetary donation, and the third a
consumption good that generates the warm glow eﬀect of a time donation. Donors would
trade income for each of these eﬀects.
Recall the functional form deﬁned in the theoretical section:
Ui = F
(
E−g+(H−hv)(1−t)wp
)
+G
(
g(1+m)+(H−hv)tδwp+hvwv
)
+I
(
g
)
+J
(
hv
)
(22)
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The structural form to be estimated13 is as follows:
Ui = F
(
incomei
)
+
(
gi(1 +m) + (H − hvi)tδwpi + hviwvi
)γ
+
(
gi
)η
+
(
hvi
)θ
(23)
Or more simply,
Ui = F
(
incomei
)
+
(
value to charityi
)γ
+
(
monetary donationi)
η+
(
time donationi
)θ
(24)
The parameters will be consistent with the assumptions of the theoretical model if 0 <
{γ, η, θ} < 1. The estimated parameters of the utility function are reported in Table 8.
The structural estimation method utilised revealed preferences to determine how close the
average choice was to two alternate choices that could have been made, while keeping the
level of income constant. These alternate choices were deﬁned as the choices that would
have been made by a completely pure altruist, and a completely impure altruist, whilst
leaving with the same level of income. The methodology is outlined in detail on p. 51,
and applies techniques outlined by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrm (2010).
Deﬁnition 5.1. Deﬁne gˆit and ˆhvit as the observed choices of donated money and time,
and the associated level of income kept by the agent yˆit, where i refers to the individual
and t refers to the choices made by each individual.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Deﬁne g′it and h
′
vit
as the choice of git and hvit that would maximise the
value generated for charity, subject to keeping the level of income yˆit constant.
14 In other
words, this is the choice that would be made by an agent solely driven by pure altruism.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Deﬁne g′′it and h
′′
vit
as the choice of git and hvit that would maximise warm
glow (assuming the agent derives equal warm glow from money and time donations, when
their marginal cost is equal), subject to keeping the level of income yˆit constant. In other
words, this is the choice that would be made by an agent solely driven by impure altruism.
13The functional form chosen is independent of the utility derived from income. This is a consequence of
the estimation method. The general solution to the optimisation problem is neither simple nor estimable.
As such, it was necessary to use alternate methods. The method required dropping one of the arguments
of the utility function. Since the goal is to determine the motivations behind charitable giving, rather
than income and charitable giving, this was the most useful option. Further, choosing to focus solely on
the relationship between forms of charitable giving, whilst allowing for any functional form over income,
has the advantage of avoiding the eﬀect of reference points for earned income during the experiment.
14Note the distinction from g∗it, h
∗
vit in the previous section.
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By revealed preferences, it must be the case that:
Uit(gˆit, ˆhvit , yˆit) ≥ Uit(g′it, h′vit , yˆit)
and Uit(gˆit, ˆhvit , yˆit) ≥ Uit(g′′it, h′′vit , yˆit)
now since (g′, h′vit , yˆit) = (g′′it, h′′vit , yˆit) by construction
∴ Uit(g′, h′vit , yˆit) = Uit(g′′it, h′′vit , yˆit)
∴ 2 · Uit(gˆit, ˆhvit , yˆit) > Uit(g′, h′vit , yˆit) + Uit(g′′it, h′′vit , yˆit)
∴ Uit(gˆit, ˆhvit , yˆit)−
1
2
· Uit(g′, h′vit , yˆit)−
1
2
· Uit(g′′, h′′vit , yˆit) > 0
∴ F
(
yˆit
)
+
(
gˆit(1 +m) + (H − ˆhvit)tδwpit + ˆhvitwvit
)γ
+
(
gˆit
)η
+
(
ˆhvit
)θ − 1
2
[
F
(
yˆit
)
+
(
g′it(1 +m) + (H − h′vit)tδwpit + h′vitwvit
)γ
+
(
g′it
)η
+
(
h′vit
)θ]
− 1
2
[
F
(
yˆit
)
+
(
g′′it(1 +m) + (H − h′′vit)tδwpit + h′′vitwvit
)γ
+
(
g′′it
)η
+
(
h′′vit
)θ]
> 0
∴
(
gˆit(1 +m) + (H − ˆhvit)tδwpit + ˆhvitwvit
)γ
+
(
gˆit
)η
+
(
ˆhvit
)θ − 1
2
[(
g′it(1 +m) + (H − h′vit)tδwpit + h′vitwvit
)γ
+
(
g′it
)η
+
(
h′vit
)θ]
− 1
2
[(
g′′it(1 +m) + (H − h′′vit)tδwpit + h′′vitwvit
)γ
+
(
g′′it
)η
+
(
h′′vit
)θ]
> 0
Now, deﬁne the LHS of the above inequality as ∇uit. Denote {gˆit, ˆhvit , g′, h′vit , g′′, h′′vit} as Yit and {g,m,wp, wv, t, δ} as Xit. The Probit
transformation, Φ(∇uit) scales the values of ∇uit in the range (0,1) without aﬀecting the ordering between values.
Therefore, the problem can now be solved by the following non-linear maximisation:
argmax
γ,η,θ
lnL(γ, η, θ;Yit, Xit) =
n∑
i=1
24∑
t=1
lnΦ(∇uit) (1)
1
The structural estimation method then uses simulated maximum likelihood to choose
joint values of {γ, η, θ} that maximises the likelihood of each choice being observed, ac-
cording to the probit index deﬁned on Page p.51. Put simply, the log-likelihood function
determines the most likely values of {γ, η, θ} for the above utility function that give the
best predictions of the choices made throughout the experiment. It follows that as far
as observed choices are consistent with a desire to maximise charitable contributions, the
larger the scaling factor on the charity argument of the utility function, γ. This would
necessitate that the powers on the warm glow from a monetary and a time donation,
(η, θ) would decline, since these choices would appear inconsistent with a utility function
described by impure altruism. The converse is true for aggregate choices that appear
consistent with impure altruism. Formally:
As {gˆi, hˆvi} → {g′i, h′vi} , {γ, η, θ} → {1, 0, 0} and
As {gˆi, hˆvi} → {g′′i , h′′vi} , {γ, η, θ} → {0, 1, 1} (25)
Therefore, the value of γ represents the scale of pure altruism, and the values of η, θ the
scale of warm glow over monetary and time donations respectively. A value of 0 for any of
these parameters would represent an absence of any utility derived from pure or impure
eﬀects respectively.
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The estimated parameters of the utility function, for the baseline and with the marginal
eﬀect of the prime, are reported in Table 8. The choices made by agents in the baseline
treatment are best described by the following utility function15:
Ug,hvi =
(
value to charityi
)0.12
+
(
monetary donationi)
0.11 +
(
time donationi
)0.17
(26)
whereas in the pure priming treatment, the utility function is best modelled by:
Ug,hvi =
(
value to charityi
)0.28
+
(
monetary donationi)
0.11 +
(
time donationi
)0.07
(27)
The pure priming was eﬀective in increasing the motivation to increase the value of the
charitable good. However, the priming diminished the warm glow generated from dona-
tions of time (p < 0.05), but had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the warm glow from donations
of money. The aggregated eﬀect of the prime was to lower the overall level of donations,
as the amount of donated time fell by a quarter (Table 5) in the treatment with pure
priming.
The following section will discuss the implications of these results.
15Note that all arguments of the function are measured in dollars, except hvi which is measured in
minutes
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Table 8
Estimated parameters of the structural model
Baseline Pure Aggregated
Treatment Treatment Treatments
γ
(Pure- provision of charity)
Baseline 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Pure Priming† 0.279∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
η
(Warm glow of money)
Baseline 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Pure Priming† 0.116∗∗ 0.0098
(0.045) (0.842)
θ
(Warm glow of time)
Baseline 0.170∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Pure Priming† 0.065∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.000) (0.043)
Pseudo-log-likelihood -2406.7 -2508.1 -4914.8
Observations 1200 1200 2400
p values in parentheses
Standard Errors are clustered by each individual
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
†Pure priming values are reported as marginal eﬀects in the aggregated
treatments and should be added to the baseline values.
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6 Discussion
This section will outline how these results contribute to the current body of literature,
and their implications for government and charity policies.
Firstly, the model outlined in the theoretical section has been well supported by the
experimental outcomes, and all four resulting predictions have been conﬁrmed. Demand
for donations and for volunteering is directed by both a pure motivation to increase the
scope of the public good (for which demand is nonseparable), and separable warm glow
arguments. Therefore, the volunteering puzzle can be robustly explained by diminishing
warm glow eﬀects, even when absent of any signalling eﬀects (Figure 9).
The degree of substitutability of time and money is more clearly assessed using Hicksian
demands. Hicksian compensation is the amount of money required to return the agent
to the original indiﬀerence curve at the new prices, whilst Slutsky compensation is the
amount of money needed to consume the original consumption bundle at new prices. For
small changes, Hicksian and Slutsky compensation will be identical (Varian, 1992). Thus,
the Hicksian demand is the diﬀerence in demands under original prices, and under new
prices with Slutsky-compensated income (Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz, 1996). Donations
of money and time are found to have a Hicksian cross-price substitution of 0.3% in the
baseline treatment, but 0.4% under the pure priming, demonstrating that as agents think
in terms which are more pure, donations become more substitutable. This conﬁrms
Hypotheses 3 and 4.
The prior section introduced two new methods of estimating the weight of impure al-
truism in giving. The ﬁrst approach determined the amount of income agents sacriﬁced
to consume warm glow eﬀects, by measuring the amount of potential income that was
neither allocated to the charity, nor kept as income for the giver. There are beneﬁts to
this reduced form approach. It provides a minimum price agents paid for warm glow
eﬀects which relies on no assumptions about the functional form of the utility function,
and found at least 23 cents in every dollar of giving must be due to impure eﬀects.
The beneﬁt of the structural estimation method is that it allows determinancy of the
actual utility derived from warm glow eﬀects, but it may depend on the exact speciﬁcation
of the utility function. These estimates can also address the proportions of utility that are
derived from pure and impure eﬀects. These are estimated for agents during the study,
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by including their choices in the estimated utility function. In the baseline treatment,
around a third of the utility from donations are derived from pure motivations,, whereas
two thirds of the utility are ascribed to the warm glow eﬀects. Under the pure priming,
these utility proportions are closer to equal. Detailed values are provided in Table 9 and
visualisations of the aggregate utility over the values of giving observed in the experiment
are given in Figure 9.
Table 9
Proportion of utility over charitable giving
Pure Warm Glow Warm Glow Warm Glow
(Total) (Money) (Time)
Baseline 36% 64% 28% 36%
Pure Prime 55% 45% 22% 23%
Another beneﬁt of the structural method is that policy recommendations can be con-
structed from microfoundations. The following policy estimates are approximations based
on the estimated utility function given in equation (26).
Firstly, the crowding out of voluntary donations due to a government policy of manda-
tory donations to charity, should be incomplete.16 Therefore the net provision of charity
will increase under such a policy, ceteris paribus. However, the estimates imply that any
donation which is acquired compulsorily and donated to charity would generate approx-
imately only half the utility of one which was voluntary. Take the example of a dollar
voluntarily donated to charity during a policy of a one-for-one matching pledge.17 Even
if the policies were calibrated so that the net increase in charity between the two policies
was equal, the matching scheme would generate twice the utility of the compulsory tax
for donors.
Governments attempting to subsidise charities should therefore prefer a policy of match-
ing donations to a compulsorily donated tax. Both the reduced form and structural
model showed that the matching donation would increase, rather than decrease voluntary
donations, whereas government support alone would crowd out donations. Therefore,
the matching policy is not only more eﬃcient for donors, it will decrease the cost for
16A salient example is the “Flood Levy” imposed on Australian citizens in 2011; the opposition party
argued it would be ineﬀective as it would simply reduce voluntary donations by exactly the acquired sum.
17Such as the Australian Government’s policy of equal donation matching to the Horn Of Africa crisis
instituted in October 2011.
57
government as well.
However, there is a limit to the eﬀectiveness of a match. Initially, a small match increases
donations to charity, though because utility over the provision of charity is concave, as
the match becomes too strong, donation levels begin to decrease. Further, a matching
donation on monetary donations causes substitution away from volunteering. The struc-
tural model can also provide comparative statics which give approximations for the match
which would maximise voluntary donations. When accounting for the total eﬀect of mon-
etary and time donations, the optimal matching donation is 60%, as shown in Figure
7.
Figure 7
Optimal matching donation
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Note: the optimal matching will be the value of m for which V = g + wvhv is
maximised, i.e. at dV
dm
= 0
The estimated model also highlights the dangers of drawing conclusions from one-dimensional
studies. When accounting for monetary donations alone, the optimal matching donation
would appear to be 110%. However, because the matching donation causes a substitution
away from volunteering, when accounting for the value of volunteered labour, the optimal
match is 60%.
Consider now the degree of crowding out. A policy of government donations ﬁnanced by
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Figure 8
Completeness of crowding out, money and time
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taxation would appear to crowd out the value of voluntary donations by 20%. Including
the value of the crowding out of volunteering, this ﬁgure approaches 37%. 18
Figure 9 visualises the utility function for donors during the experiment. The average
wage, eﬃciency and matching donation observed throughout the experiment was used in
constructing the utility plot. The shape of the function shows that, despite volunteered
time generally having a lower value to the charity than a wage donation equal to the
opportunity cost of the same length of time, donors are still more likely to volunteer than
donate money. However as donations increase in one dimension, the concavity implies
a greater likelihood of donating also in the substitute dimension - a feature prominent
in the aggregate data. Note that the utility function was built from a framework where
the two goods were imperfect substitutes, rather than complements, and therefore the
correlation does not imply complementarity, as many prior studies have suggested.
These results also vindicate the strategic behaviours of charities. Initially, it seems odd
that they do not simply inform donors of the low value of their volunteer labour, and ask
18Crowding out coeﬃcients are calculated from the structural model, at a tax rate of 25%. Detailed
crowding out eﬀects across tax rates are given in Figure 8
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Figure 9
Aggregated utility of money and time donations in baseline treatment
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them to continue working, and donate money instead, improving both the income of the
donor and the provisioning of the charity. The pure priming in the experiment is a proxy
for this strategy, altering the previewed the certiﬁcate to show the value being generated
for the charity. Over time, charities have also tended to market donations by appealing
to the impure aspects of giving (a t-shirt designed by the Red Cross Blood Service, reads
“I give blood. What do you do?”). In the experiment, subjects acted in a more eﬃcient
manner under a pure framing, but gave much less overall, such that the total provisioning
of charity declined by 10%.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis has established a behavioural framework for altruistic giving from microfoun-
dations. Under this framework, donations of money and time are substitutable to the
extent that motivations are pure. This ﬁnding is in contrast to two major studies which
concluded that found that donations of money and time were likely to be complements.
The result is likely due to modelling the problem structurally, rather than interpreting
results from a reduced form speciﬁcation. The model was shown to be robust by testing
several key predictions in an experiment that controlled for factors which are not ob-
servable in the ﬁeld. Given this substitutability, future empirical studies of altruism will
beneﬁt by considering eﬀects on both dimensions of altruistic giving, for their conclusions
and recommendations to be optimal.
These developments notwithstanding, the environment of this study is not without limi-
tations. The ﬁrst is that by studying the degree of impurity in an environment that is not
observable, the estimate of impure altruism only measures the aspects which are innate.
It does not however, account for the social eﬀects of signalling. Signalling is likely to be
a signiﬁcant factor in volunteering, and there would be value in accounting for this in
ﬁeld studies. Including the eﬀect of signalling, the measurement of impurity is likely to
increase.
The second major limitation is that the heterogeneity between subjects in this study is
limited. For example, as discussed in the introduction, whilst volunteering is a signiﬁcant
source of value for charities in the United States, it is proportionally smaller than in
Australia. There is no immediately obvious reason for this. Charities will undoubtedly
be interested in which subjects are relatively more pure than others, and the results in
this thesis are limited by the similar demographics of students in the sample.
Further, the decisions made during the experiment were of a relatively small scale, and
approximately half the income available to the agents was given to them, rather than
earned. List (2007) has previously demonstrated that these results have an esoteric, rather
than universal interpretation. More speciﬁcally, the point estimates should be taken
with caution. These limitations however, should not diminish the directional ﬁndings
of the model. The strongest advantage of the laboratory environment is that it is not
plagued by the real-world complexities of the ﬁeld, and thus not susceptible to changes in
government policy, endogenous responses of charities, or changes in preferences amongst
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the participants.
A ﬁeld study undertaken with an established charity, in possession of a signiﬁcant and
varied army of volunteers, would contribute signiﬁcantly to remedying most of these
aforementioned factors. The methodologies applied in the present thesis could be used
across wider contexts, both to conﬁrm the robustness of the results, and to improve the
parameter estimates.
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the charity chosen was unknown to all participants, and its
beneﬁciaries were of a diﬀerent nation and culture to the participants. The warm glow
eﬀects of donating to a known charity, to whom the donor has attachment, may diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. As a general question, does the level of attachment to a beneﬁciary, such as
the school attended by one’s children, increase or decrease the degree of pure altruism?
This information would possess particular value to governments seeking to minimise the
crowding out eﬀect of stemming from their contribution. Optimal policy would imply
that governments should support charities that have the strongest warm glow eﬀects, in
seeking to minimise crowding out.
More generally however, the growing interest in pure and impure altruism over recent
decades a testament to the value of the topic. The methodologies developed in this paper
demonstrate that they are within the scope of measurement for future research.
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A.1 Experiment Demographics
Figure 10
Demographics of lab subjects
Table 10
Demographics of Lab Subject, By Treatment
Mean Survey Data Baseline Pure Priming
Annual donations to charity ($) 127.0 112.8
Hours donated to charity 15.5 20.4
Weekly Spending ($) 64 71
Male (%) 52% 56%
Diﬃculty understanding experiment 6% 14%
ATAR/UAI 85.0 84.9
Household Income of Family Raised In 88950 94225
Pure Proxy - worthwhileness of charity (1-7) 5.1 4.5
Impure Proxy - amount of regret after
donating to an unsuccessful cause (1-7) 3.2 2.9
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A.2 Experiment Materials
Figure 11
The baseline (left) and pure framing (right) certiﬁcates.
.
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Figure 12
Choice screen example
A.3 Further Regressions
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Table 11
Donation Choices, Money and Time (Pooled, With Demographics)
( Tobit ) ( Tobit )
MonDonation TimeDonation
(Intercept) -2.38 9.37
(-1.3) (-1.19)
Pure Prime 3.64∗ -4.75∗∗∗
(-0.21) (-0.64)
Total Income (Potent) 0.32∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(-0.02) (-0.06)
Tax to Charity -0.25∗∗∗ -13.7∗
(-0.21) (-8.31)
Price Mon Giving -7.60∗∗∗ 8.46∗∗
(-1.18) (-3.52)
Price Volunteering -4.14∗∗∗ -55.8∗∗∗
(-1.0) (-3.06)
Times Donated Money 0.06 0.57∗∗∗
(-4.2) (-0.12)
Money Donated ($100s) 1.29∗∗∗ 0.00
(-0.1) (0)
Hrs Volunteered 0.01∗∗ 0.01
(-0.01) (-0.02)
Household Income ($10,000s) -0.11∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(-0.02) (-0.05)
Charity Worthwhile (1-7) 1.08∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
(-0.08) (-0.02)
Survey Impure Proxy (1-7) -0.03 1.81∗∗∗
(-0.06) (-0.2)
R2 0.313 0.367
adj.R2 0.308 0.362
N 2400 2400
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ (p ≤ 0.1), ∗∗ (p ≤ 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p ≤ 0.01)
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